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Table of Contents
Intro
Introduction
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Contents
Chapter 1: Epistemic Thought Experiment and Intuition
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Emergence of Thought Experiments in Philosophy
1.3 Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.3.1 Thought Experiment in Classical Epistemology
1.3.1.1 Plato's Theaetetus Case
1.3.1.2 Descartes' Dreamer Case
1.3.1.3 Husserl's Honeysuckle Case
1.3.2 Thought Experiment in Contemporary Epistemology
1.3.2.1 Jackson's Fred Case
1.3.2.2 Jackson's Mary Case
1.3.2.3 Searle's Chinese Room Case
1.3.2.4 Chalmers' Zombie Case
1.3.2.5 Cohen's Lottery Cases
1.3.2.6 Lehrer's Truetemp Case
1.3.2.7 Goldman's Fake Barn Case
1.3.2.8 Gettier's Cases
1.3.2.9 Kripke's GdĖ˛el-Schmidt Case
1.3.2.10 BonJour's Example of Norman the Clairvoyant
1.4 Commentaries on Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.4.1 Characterizations of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.4.2 The Structures of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.5 Intuition in Epistemology
1.5.1 Epistemic Intuition in Classical Epistemology
1.5.2 Epistemic Intuition in Contemporary Epistemology
1.5.2.1 Intuition in some Intuition-Theorists' Accounts
1.5.2.1.1 Chudnoff's Phenomenology-Based View
1.5.2.1.2 Sosa's Competence-Based View
1.5.2.1.3 Bealer's Sui Generis Mental State-Based View
1.6 Mathematical Platonism
1.7 Epistemology without Intuition
1.8 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 2: The Nature of Epistemic Intuition
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Intuition as Mental State
2.2.1 Bealer's Intellectual Seeming Analysis
2.2.2 Sosa's Understanding Analysis
2.2.3 Chudnoff's Intellectual Perception Analysis
2.3 Ascriptions of Intuition
2.3.1 Intuition and the A Priori
2.3.1.1 The Experimental Approach
2.3.1.2 Peacemaking Attempts
2.3.1.2.1 Conciliatory Argument
2.3.1.2.2 Anti- skepticism Argument
2.3.1.2.3 Argument from Anti- A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction
2.3.1.2.4 Argument from the A Priori-Naturalism Compatibility
2.3.1.3 Two Possible Responses
2.3.1.3.1 Against the Number Sequence Argument
2.3.1.3.2 Against the Argument from Concepts
2.3.1.4 Intuition and Multi-dimensionality
2.3.2 Non-propositional Intuition
2.3.3 Non-phenomenal Intuition
2.4 The Individuation of Intuition
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3: The Epistemic Status of Intuitions
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reliabilism About Intuition
3.2.1 Bealer on Modal Reliabilism
3.2.2 Sosa on the Competence-Based View
3.2.3 Chudnoff on Phenomenal Dogmatism
3.3 The Challenges of Experimentalism
3.3.1 The Variation Argument
3.3.2 The Calibration Argument
3.4 Perspectival Relativism About Intuition
3.5 The Desiderata for an Account of the Epistemic Status of Intuition
3.5.1 Intuition Appears to Be a Crucial Part of the Relevant Thought Experiment
Introduction
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Contents
Chapter 1: Epistemic Thought Experiment and Intuition
1.1 Introduction
1.2 The Emergence of Thought Experiments in Philosophy
1.3 Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.3.1 Thought Experiment in Classical Epistemology
1.3.1.1 Plato's Theaetetus Case
1.3.1.2 Descartes' Dreamer Case
1.3.1.3 Husserl's Honeysuckle Case
1.3.2 Thought Experiment in Contemporary Epistemology
1.3.2.1 Jackson's Fred Case
1.3.2.2 Jackson's Mary Case
1.3.2.3 Searle's Chinese Room Case
1.3.2.4 Chalmers' Zombie Case
1.3.2.5 Cohen's Lottery Cases
1.3.2.6 Lehrer's Truetemp Case
1.3.2.7 Goldman's Fake Barn Case
1.3.2.8 Gettier's Cases
1.3.2.9 Kripke's GdĖ˛el-Schmidt Case
1.3.2.10 BonJour's Example of Norman the Clairvoyant
1.4 Commentaries on Thought Experiments in Epistemology
1.4.1 Characterizations of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.4.2 The Structures of Thought Experiment and Their Epistemic Function
1.5 Intuition in Epistemology
1.5.1 Epistemic Intuition in Classical Epistemology
1.5.2 Epistemic Intuition in Contemporary Epistemology
1.5.2.1 Intuition in some Intuition-Theorists' Accounts
1.5.2.1.1 Chudnoff's Phenomenology-Based View
1.5.2.1.2 Sosa's Competence-Based View
1.5.2.1.3 Bealer's Sui Generis Mental State-Based View
1.6 Mathematical Platonism
1.7 Epistemology without Intuition
1.8 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 2: The Nature of Epistemic Intuition
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Intuition as Mental State
2.2.1 Bealer's Intellectual Seeming Analysis
2.2.2 Sosa's Understanding Analysis
2.2.3 Chudnoff's Intellectual Perception Analysis
2.3 Ascriptions of Intuition
2.3.1 Intuition and the A Priori
2.3.1.1 The Experimental Approach
2.3.1.2 Peacemaking Attempts
2.3.1.2.1 Conciliatory Argument
2.3.1.2.2 Anti- skepticism Argument
2.3.1.2.3 Argument from Anti- A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction
2.3.1.2.4 Argument from the A Priori-Naturalism Compatibility
2.3.1.3 Two Possible Responses
2.3.1.3.1 Against the Number Sequence Argument
2.3.1.3.2 Against the Argument from Concepts
2.3.1.4 Intuition and Multi-dimensionality
2.3.2 Non-propositional Intuition
2.3.3 Non-phenomenal Intuition
2.4 The Individuation of Intuition
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3: The Epistemic Status of Intuitions
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Reliabilism About Intuition
3.2.1 Bealer on Modal Reliabilism
3.2.2 Sosa on the Competence-Based View
3.2.3 Chudnoff on Phenomenal Dogmatism
3.3 The Challenges of Experimentalism
3.3.1 The Variation Argument
3.3.2 The Calibration Argument
3.4 Perspectival Relativism About Intuition
3.5 The Desiderata for an Account of the Epistemic Status of Intuition
3.5.1 Intuition Appears to Be a Crucial Part of the Relevant Thought Experiment