Intro
Acknowledgements
Contents
Introduction: Out of Our Heads
Chapter 1: A Roadmap from the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind
1.1 Where Does the Mind Stop?
1.2 Concepts of Cognition and Consciousness
1.3 4E's: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended
1.3.1 Embodied
1.3.2 Embedded
1.3.3 Enacted
1.3.4 Extended
1.4 From the Extended Mind to the Extended Conscious Mind
1.4.1 The Extended Mind
1.4.2 The Waves to the Extended Conscious Mind
1.4.3 Vehicular Externalism
1.5 Conclusions and Methodological Remarks
References

Chapter 2: Arguments for Extended Conscious Mind
2.1 Introduction
2.2 First Argument for ECM: Parity Argument
2.2.1 Cognition and Consciousness Are Often Inseparable
2.2.2 Occurrent EM
2.2.3 Wheeler's Objection
2.2.4 Summing Up the First Argument
2.3 Second Argument for ECM: Sensorimotor Enactivism
2.3.1 Landscapes of Sensorimotor Enactivism
2.3.2 Bridging the Comparative Explanatory Gap
2.3.3 Sensorimotor Reductionism or Sensorimotor Integrationism?
2.3.4 Temporal Nature, Virtual Presence
2.3.5 Arguments Drawn from Sensorimotor Enactivism in Support of ECM

2.3.6 Does Entailment Hold? From the Personal to the Sub-Personal Level
2.3.7 Summing Up the Second Argument
2.4 Third Argument for ECM: The Leaky Body
2.4.1 Experience Is Embodied
2.4.2 The Frontiers of the Body Are Not Rigid
2.4.3 External Body Parts as Substrates of Experience
2.5 Conclusions to the Three Arguments
References
Chapter 3: The Constitution-Turn and Extended Conscious Mind
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The Causal-Constitution Fallacy
3.1.2 The Constituted Phenomenon: The Dynamic Nature of Experiences
3.2 Defining Constitution

3.2.1 Material Constitution
3.2.2 Mechanist Constitution
The Ambiguity in the Mechanistic Model
3.2.3 Diachronic-Dynamical Constitution
3.3 Demarcating the System Boundaries
3.3.1 Mutual Manipulability as a Demarcation Criterion
Mutual Manipulability in Practice
Limitations of Mutual Manipulability
3.4 Conclusions
References
Chapter 4: Tools as Extenders: The Pathway to Functional Incorporation
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Spectrum of Extensions
4.2.1 Momentary Extension
4.2.2 Integrated Extension
4.2.3 Prosthetic Incorporation

4.2.4 Functional Incorporation
4.2.5 Summing Up the Four Degrees of Extension
4.3 "Glue & Trust" Conditions
4.3.1 Glue & Trust Conditions for EM
4.3.2 Criteria Compared with ECM
4.3.3 Glue & Trust Conditions for ECM
4.4 An Example of Functional Incorporation: Sensory Substitution
4.5 Conclusions
References
Chapter 5: Possible Objections to Extended Conscious Mind
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Clark's Criticisms of ECM
5.2 The Argument from High Bandwidth
5.2.1 Answers to the High-Bandwidth Argument
5.3 Predictive Processing