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001478389 019__ $$a(OCoLC)1049624422
001478389 019__ $$a(OCoLC)1054878018
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001478389 0247_ $$a10.4159/9780674036772$$2doi
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001478389 1001_ $$aFeaver, Peter D., $$eauthor.$$4aut$$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
001478389 24510 $$aArmed Servants :$$bAgency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations /$$cPeter D. Feaver.
001478389 264_1 $$aCambridge, MA : $$bHarvard University Press, $$c[2009]
001478389 264_4 $$c©2005
001478389 300__ $$a1 online resource (400 p.)
001478389 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001478389 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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001478389 50500 $$tFrontmatter -- $$tContents -- $$tPreface -- $$tCHAPTER 1. Introduction -- $$tCHAPTER 2. Huntington's Cold War Puzzle -- $$tCHAPTER 3. The Informal Agency Theory -- $$tCHAPTER 4. A Formal Agency Model of Civil-Military Relations -- $$tCHAPTER 5. An Agency Theory Solution to the Cold War Puzzle -- $$tCHAPTER 6. Explaining the Post-Cold War "Crisis," 1990-2000 -- $$tCHAPTER 7. Using Agency Theory to Explore the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era -- $$tCHAPTER 8. Conclusion -- $$tNotes -- $$tReferences -- $$tIndex
001478389 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001478389 520__ $$aHow do civilians control the military? In the wake of September 11, the renewed presence of national security in everyday life has made this question all the more pressing. In this book, Peter Feaver proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the "armed servants" of the nation-state. Military obedience is not automatic but depends on strategic calculations of whether civilians will catch and punish misbehavior. This model challenges Samuel Huntington's professionalism-based model of civil-military relations, and provides an innovative way of making sense of the U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War experience--especially the distinctively stormy civil-military relations of the Clinton era. In the decade after the Cold War ended, civilians and the military had a variety of run-ins over whether and how to use military force. These episodes, as interpreted by agency theory, contradict the conventional wisdom that civil-military relations matter only if there is risk of a coup. On the contrary, military professionalism does not by itself ensure unchallenged civilian authority. As Feaver argues, agency theory offers the best foundation for thinking about relations between military and civilian leaders, now and in the future.
001478389 538__ $$aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
001478389 546__ $$aIn English.
001478389 5880_ $$aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
001478389 650_0 $$aCivil supremacy over the military$$zUnited States.
001478389 650_0 $$aCivil-military relations$$zUnited States.
001478389 650_0 $$aElectronic books$$vlocal.
001478389 650_7 $$aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / General.$$2bisacsh
001478389 655_0 $$aElectronic books
001478389 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tHUP eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 (Canada)$$z9783110756067
001478389 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tHarvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013$$z9783110442205
001478389 852__ $$bebk
001478389 85640 $$3De Gruyter$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674036772$$zOnline Access 
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001478389 912__ $$a978-3-11-075606-7  HUP eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 (Canada)$$b2013
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