@article{1478434,
      recid = {1478434},
      author = {Gómez-Ibáñez, José A., },
      title = {Regulating Infrastructure : Monopoly, Contracts, and  Discretion /},
      pages = {1 online resource (448 p.)},
      abstract = {In the 1980s and '90s many countries turned to the private  sector to provide infrastructure and utilities, such as  gas, telephones, and highways--with the idea that  market-based incentives would control costs and improve the  quality of essential services. But subsequent debacles  including the collapse of California's wholesale  electricity market and the bankruptcy of Britain's largest  railroad company have raised troubling questions about  privatization. This book addresses one of the most vexing  of these: how can government fairly and effectively  regulate "natural monopolies"--those infrastructure and  utility services whose technologies make competition  impractical? Rather than sticking to economics, José  Gómez-Ibáñez draws on history, politics, and a  wealth of examples to provide a road map for various  approaches to regulation. He makes a strong case for  favoring market-oriented and contractual  approaches--including private contracts between  infrastructure providers and customers as well as  concession contracts with the government acting as an  intermediary--over those that grant government regulators  substantial discretion. Contracts can provide stronger  protection for infrastructure customers and suppliers--and  greater opportunities to tailor services to their mutual  advantage. In some cases, however, the requirements of the  firms and their customers are too unpredictable for  contracts to work, and alternative schemes may be needed.  Table of Contents: Acknowledgments 1. Monopoly as a  Contracting Problem 2. The Choice of Regulatory Strategy  Part I. Regulatory Politics and Dynamics 3. The Behavior of  Regulatory Agencies 4. Capture and Instability: Sri Lankas  Buses and U.S. Telephones 5. Incompleteness and Its  Consequences: Argentinas Railroads 6. Forestalling  Expropriation: Electricity in the Americas Part II.  Contract versus Discretionary Regulation 7. The Evolution  of Concession Contracts: Municipal Franchises in North  America 8. The Rediscovery of Private Contracts: U.S.  Railroad and Airline Deregulation--with John R. Meyer 9.  Price-Cap Regulation: The British Water Industry Part III.  Vertical Unbundling and Regulation 10. The Trade-off in  Unbundling: Competition versus Coordination 11. Regulating  Coordination: British Railroads 12. Designing Capacity  Markets: Electricity in Argentina--with Martín  Rodríguez-Pardina 13. The Prospects for Unbundling 14.  The Future of Regulation Notes Index Regulating  Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts and Discretion is a  book that merges the modern economics of the firm with  traditional regulatory concerns in an original and  provocative way. It is a valuable contribution to the  literature that should be read by anyone concerned with  redefining regulation for the new Century.--Michael E.  Levine, Yale Law School},
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/1478434},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674037809},
}