@article{1478471,
      author = {Acemoglu, Daron,  and Aghion, Philippe,  and Alesina,  Alberto,  and Bautista, María Angélica,  and Besley,  Timothy,  and Diermeier, Daniel,  and Drelichman, Mauricio,   and Fearon, James D.,  and Fong, Pohan,  and Greif, Avner,   and Grossman, Gene M.,  and Helpman, Elhanan,  and  Helpman, Elhanan,  and Kudamatsu, Masayuki,  and Mokyr,  Joel,  and Muthoo, Abhinay,  and Nunn, Nathan,  and  Persson, Torsten,  and Querubín, Pablo,  and Robinson,  James A.,  and Shepsle, Kenneth A.,  and Tabellini, Guido,   and Trebbi, Francesco,  and Voth, Hans-Joachim, },
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/1478471},
      title = {Institutions and Economic Performance /},
      abstract = {Institutions and Economic Performance explores the  question of why income per capita varies so greatly across  countries. Even taking into account disparities in  resources, including physical and human capital, large  economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are  some societies but not others able to encourage investments  in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book  argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences  across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and  include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of  economic and political elites, informal institutions that  promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two  core themes run through the contributors' essays. First,  what constraints do institutions place on the power of the  executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and  effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are  productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and  Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics,  political science, history, and sociology to address its  central question.},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674038578},
      recid = {1478471},
      pages = {1 online resource (624 p.)},
}