001479140 000__ 06047nam\a22009735i\4500 001479140 001__ 1479140 001479140 003__ DE-B1597 001479140 005__ 20231026035013.0 001479140 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\ 001479140 007__ cr\un\nnnunnun 001479140 008__ 210830t20132012mau\\\\\o\\d\z\\\\\\eng\d 001479140 019__ $$a(OCoLC)840437326 001479140 020__ $$a9780674067325 001479140 0247_ $$a10.4159/harvard.9780674067325$$2doi 001479140 035__ $$a(DE-B1597)178053 001479140 035__ $$a(OCoLC)819330020 001479140 040__ $$aDE-B1597$$beng$$cDE-B1597$$erda 001479140 0410_ $$aeng 001479140 044__ $$amau$$cUS-MA 001479140 050_4 $$aKF5130$$b.E67 2013eb 001479140 072_7 $$aLAW111000$$2bisacsh 001479140 08204 $$a347.7314$$221 001479140 1001_ $$aEpstein, Lee, $$eauthor.$$4aut$$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 001479140 24514 $$aThe Behavior of Federal Judges :$$bA Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice /$$cLee Epstein, William M Landes, Richard A Posner. 001479140 264_1 $$aCambridge, MA : $$bHarvard University Press, $$c[2013] 001479140 264_4 $$c©2012 001479140 300__ $$a1 online resource (446 p.) :$$b20 graphs, 100 tables 001479140 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent 001479140 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia 001479140 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier 001479140 347__ $$atext file$$bPDF$$2rda 001479140 50500 $$tFrontmatter -- $$tContents -- $$tList of Figures -- $$tList of Tables -- $$tGeneral Introduction -- $$tTechnical Introduction -- $$t1. A Realistic Theory of Judicial Behavior -- $$t2. The Previous Empirical Literature -- $$t3. The Supreme Court -- $$t4. The Courts of Appeals -- $$t5. The District Courts and the Selection Effect -- $$t6. Dissents and Dissent Aversion -- $$t7. The Questioning of Lawyers at Oral Argument -- $$t8. The Auditioners -- $$tConclusion: The Way Forward -- $$tAcknowledgments -- $$tIndex 001479140 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users. 001479140 520__ $$aJudges play a central role in the American legal system, but their behavior as decision makers is not well understood, even among themselves. The system permits judges to be quite secretive (and most of them are), so indirect methods are required to make sense of their behavior. Here, a political scientist, an economist, and a judge work together to construct a unified theory of judicial decision-making. Using statistical methods to test hypotheses, they dispel the mystery of how judicial decisions in district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court are made. The authors derive their hypotheses from a labor-market model, which allows them to consider judges as they would any other economic actors: as self-interested individuals motivated by both the pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of their work. In their view, this model describes judicial behavior better than either the traditional "legalist" theory, which sees judges as automatons who mechanically apply the law to the facts, or the current dominant theory in political science, which exaggerates the ideological component in judicial behavior. Ideology does figure into decision-making at all levels of the federal judiciary, the authors find, but its influence is not uniform. It diminishes as one moves down the judicial hierarchy from the Supreme Court to the courts of appeals to the district courts. As The Behavior of Federal Judges demonstrates, the good news is that ideology does not extinguish the influence of other components in judicial decision-making. Federal judges are not just robots or politicians in robes. 001479140 538__ $$aMode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. 001479140 546__ $$aIn English. 001479140 5880_ $$aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) 001479140 650_0 $$aJudicial process$$zUnited States. 001479140 650_7 $$aLAW / Judicial Power.$$2bisacsh 001479140 655_0 $$aElectronic books 001479140 7001_ $$aLandes, William M, $$eauthor.$$4aut$$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 001479140 7001_ $$aPosner, Richard A, $$eauthor.$$4aut$$4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut 001479140 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tE-BOOK GESAMTPAKET / COMPLETE PACKAGE 2013$$z9783110317350$$oZDB-23-DGG 001479140 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tE-BOOK PACKAGE LAW 2013$$z9783110317206 001479140 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tE-BOOK PAKET RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTEN 2013$$z9783110317190$$oZDB-23-DGC 001479140 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tHUP eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 (Canada)$$z9783110756067 001479140 77308 $$iTitle is part of eBook package:$$dDe Gruyter$$tHarvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013$$z9783110442205 001479140 852__ $$bebk 001479140 85640 $$3De Gruyter$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674067325$$zOnline Access 001479140 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1479140$$pGLOBAL_SET 001479140 912__ $$a978-3-11-031720-6 E-BOOK PACKAGE LAW 2013$$b2013 001479140 912__ $$a978-3-11-044220-5 Harvard University Press eBook Package Backlist 2000-2013$$c2000$$d2013 001479140 912__ $$a978-3-11-075606-7 HUP eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 (Canada)$$b2013 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_BACKALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_CL_LAEC 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_EBACKALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_EBKALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_ECL_LAEC 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_EEBKALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_ESSHALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_ESTMALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_PPALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_SSHALL 001479140 912__ $$aEBA_STMALL 001479140 912__ $$aGBV-deGruyter-alles 001479140 912__ $$aPDA11SSHE 001479140 912__ $$aPDA12STME 001479140 912__ $$aPDA13ENGE 001479140 912__ $$aPDA17SSHEE 001479140 912__ $$aPDA18STMEE 001479140 912__ $$aPDA5EBK 001479140 912__ $$aZDB-23-DGC$$b2013 001479140 912__ $$aZDB-23-DGG$$b2013 001479140 980__ $$aBIB 001479140 980__ $$aEBOOK 001479140 982__ $$aEbook 001479140 983__ $$aOnline