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Table of Contents
Frontmatter
Contents
Preface
Introduction
I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s
2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives
4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors
Notes
References
Acknowledgments
Index
Contents
Preface
Introduction
I Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
1 U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s
2 The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
3 Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
II Agency Costs, Residual Claims, and Incentives
4 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure
5 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of Agency Theory
6 Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
7 Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
8 The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors
Notes
References
Acknowledgments
Index