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001480853 001__ 1480853
001480853 003__ OCoLC
001480853 005__ 20231031003312.0
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001480853 008__ 230916s2023\\\\sz\\\\\\ob\\\\001\0\eng\d
001480853 019__ $$a1397314703
001480853 020__ $$a9783031386886$$qelectronic book
001480853 020__ $$a3031386884$$qelectronic book
001480853 020__ $$z3031386876
001480853 020__ $$z9783031386879
001480853 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-031-38688-6$$2doi
001480853 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1397571237
001480853 040__ $$aEBLCP$$beng$$erda$$cEBLCP$$dYDX$$dGW5XE$$dN$T$$dYDX
001480853 049__ $$aISEA
001480853 050_4 $$aJZ5665$$b.K36 2023
001480853 08204 $$a327.1/747$$223/eng/20230926
001480853 1001_ $$aKang, Kyungkook.
001480853 24510 $$aAverting nuclear war /$$cKyungkook Kang, Jacek Kugler.
001480853 264_1 $$aCham :$$bSpringer,$$c2023.
001480853 300__ $$a1 online resource (165 p.).
001480853 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001480853 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001480853 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001480853 4901_ $$aAdvanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications
001480853 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
001480853 5050_ $$aIntro -- Preface -- Contents -- Abbreviation -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) -- Size of Nuclear Arsenals and Delivery Capabilities -- Averting Nuclear War -- References -- 2 Deterrence -- Overview -- Altruistic Deterrence -- Neorealist Deterrence -- Tenuous Deterrence -- The Unsolved Nuclear Stability Puzzle -- References -- 3 Disarmament -- Global Nuclear Zero -- Non-Proliferation Treaty and Regional Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones -- Nuclear Proliferation -- References -- 4 Warfighting -- Need for Flexible Options
001480853 5058_ $$aNuclear Utilization Target Selection (NUTS) -- Nuclear Superiority -- Renewed Debate on Warfighting -- References -- 5 Conditional Deterrence: Modeling Nuclear Stability -- Elements of Conditional Deterrence -- Conventional Military Capability -- Nuclear Military Capability -- Satisfaction with the Status Quo -- Model of Conditional Deterrence -- Deterrence Game Under Total Anarchy (on the Right-Hand Path) -- Cooperation Game Under Conditional Anarchy (on the Left-Hand Path) -- Summary -- References -- 6 Findings -- Altruistic and Neorealist Deterrence -- Nuclear Disarmament -- Warfighting
001480853 5058_ $$aConditional Deterrence: Our Findings -- Conditional Deterrence: Challenges and Opportunities -- References -- 7 Conclusion -- What Can Be Done -- Concluding Remarks -- References -- Index
001480853 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001480853 520__ $$aThis timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability. To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace. The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.
001480853 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed September 26, 2023).
001480853 650_0 $$aNuclear crisis stability.
001480853 650_0 $$aDeterrence (Strategy)
001480853 650_0 $$aNuclear arms control.$$zSoviet Union$$0(DLC)sh2008108253
001480853 650_0 $$aNuclear weapons.$$0(DLC)sh 85092943
001480853 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001480853 7001_ $$aKugler, Jacek.
001480853 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aKang, Kyungkook$$tAverting Nuclear War$$dCham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2023$$z9783031386879
001480853 830_0 $$aAdvanced sciences and technologies for security applications.
001480853 852__ $$bebk
001480853 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-031-38688-6$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001480853 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1480853$$pGLOBAL_SET
001480853 980__ $$aBIB
001480853 980__ $$aEBOOK
001480853 982__ $$aEbook
001480853 983__ $$aOnline
001480853 994__ $$a92$$bISE