001484799 000__ 03649cam\\2200529\i\4500
001484799 001__ 1484799
001484799 003__ OCoLC
001484799 005__ 20240117003337.0
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001484799 008__ 231219s2023\\\\si\a\\\\ob\\\\001\0\eng\d
001484799 019__ $$a1413734688$$a1413735827
001484799 020__ $$a9789819954872$$q(electronic bk.)
001484799 020__ $$a9819954878$$q(electronic bk.)
001484799 020__ $$z9789819954865
001484799 020__ $$z981995486X
001484799 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2$$2doi
001484799 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1415206272
001484799 040__ $$aGW5XE$$beng$$erda$$epn$$cGW5XE$$dYDX$$dOCLKB
001484799 049__ $$aISEA
001484799 050_4 $$aHB199
001484799 08204 $$a330.0151$$223/eng/20231219
001484799 1001_ $$aSung, Jaeyoung,$$eauthor.
001484799 24510 $$aContract theory :$$bdiscrete- and continuous-time models /$$cJaeyoung Sung.
001484799 264_1 $$aSingapore :$$bSpringer,$$c2023.
001484799 300__ $$a1 online resource (337 pages) :$$billustrations (black and white, and color).
001484799 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
001484799 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
001484799 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
001484799 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and indexes.
001484799 5050_ $$aIntroduction -- Incentive Problems -- Basic Structures of Contracting Problems -- Discrete-Time Formulation I -- Discrete-Time Formulation II -- Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Multiplicative Preferences -- Optimal Performance Metrics -- Contracting under Incomplete Information -- Career Concerns in Competitive Executive Job Markets -- Agency Problem in Weak Formulation -- Contracting with a Mean-Volatility Controlled Outcome -- Hierarchical Contracting: A Mean-Volatility Control Problem -- Contracting in Continuous Time: Time-Additive Preferences -- Contracting under Ambiguity: Introduction -- Contracting under Ambiguity in Continuous Time -- Information Asymmetry: Hidden Information -- Information Asymmetry: Adverse Selection -- Information Asymmetry: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.
001484799 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
001484799 520__ $$aThis book provides a self-contained introduction to discrete-time and continuous-time models in contracting theory to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in economics and finance and researchers focusing on closed-form solutions and their economic implications. Discrete-time models are introduced to highlight important elements in both economics and mathematics of contracting problems and to serve as a bridge for continuous-time models and their applications. The book serves as a bridge between the currently two almost separate strands of textbooks on discrete- and continuous-time contracting models This book is written in a manner that makes complex mathematical concepts more accessible to economists. However, it would also be an invaluable tool for applied mathematicians who are looking to learn about possible economic applications of various control methods.
001484799 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
001484799 650_0 $$aTime and economic reactions.
001484799 650_0 $$aEconomics$$xMathematical models.$$xEconomic conditions$$0(DLC)sh 85001945
001484799 650_0 $$aFinance$$xMathematical models.
001484799 655_0 $$aElectronic books.
001484799 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aSung, Jaeyoung.$$tContract theory.$$dSingapore : Springer, 2023$$z9789819954865$$w(OCoLC)1402252187
001484799 852__ $$bebk
001484799 85640 $$3Springer Nature$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
001484799 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:1484799$$pGLOBAL_SET
001484799 980__ $$aBIB
001484799 980__ $$aEBOOK
001484799 982__ $$aEbook
001484799 983__ $$aOnline
001484799 994__ $$a92$$bISE