Intro
Table of Contents
Essential Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
1.1 Science Fiction, Legal Fictions and the "Plasticity" of Criminal Law
1.2 The Definitional Problem of Artificial Intelligence
1.3 A Three-Ring Circus: E-Personhood, Failures of Causation, and Guilty Robot Minds
1.3.1 e-Personhood
1.3.2 Failures of Causation
1.3.3 Guilty Robot Minds
1.4 Research Question &
Structure of Chapters
1.5 Methodology
1.6 AIs Going Bad - Examples
2 Defining Artificial Intelligence
2.1 Introduction: To Define or Not To Define?
2.2 A Short History of AI
2.3 Gaining a Basic Understanding of Modern AI Systems
2.4 Definitions of AI: an Overview
2.5 Adopted Working Definition
2.6 Conclusions
3 Expansionists, Moderates, Skeptics: the Scholarly Debate on AI and Criminal Law
3.1 Introduction. The Scholarly Debate on Criminal Liability of AI-Systems
3.2 Expansionists (or the Front of Robotic Liberation)
3.2.1 Gabriel Hallevy - the AI "Believer"
3.2.2 Ying Hu: a Criminal Code for Robots
3.2.3 Christina Mulligan: Revenge Against Robots
3.2.4 Lasse Quarck: the German Exception
3.3 Moderates
3.3.1 Ryan Abbott and Alex Sarch: a General Theory for AI-Punishment
3.3.2 Lagioia and Sartor
3.3.3 Freitas, Andrade, Novais - Nora Osmani
3.3.4 Simmler and Markwalder
3.3.5 Mihail Diamantis: the Corporate Mind and Body Approach
3.4 Skeptics
3.4.1 The Italian Approach
3.4.2 Ugo Pagallo
3.4.3 Dafni Lima
3.4.4 Peter Asaro: A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn
3.4.5 The German Approach
3.4.5.1 Sabine Gless, Thomas Weigend, and Emily Silverman
3.4.5.2 Susanne Beck
3.4.5.3 Gerhard Seher
3.5 Conclusions
4 Ascription: Introducing Chapters 5 &
6
4.1 On Paperclips, Planes, and AI.

4.2 Theories of Criminalization
4.3 Methodology and Structure of Chapters 5 and 6
5 Criminal Capacity
5.1 What is an AI Agent, Exactly?
5.2 Artificial Intelligence Systems as Rechtspersonen? A Quick Glimpse into the Vexata Quaestio of E-Personhood
5.3 Capacity in Criminal Law
5.3.1 Criminal or Moral Machines?
5.3.1.1 MIT's Moral Machine
5.3.1.2 The Burning Room Dilemma
5.3.1.3 Comment
5.3.2 Action Control
5.4 On Artificial Insane and Infant Offenders
5.4.1 Artificial Insane Offenders
5.4.2 Artificial Infant Offenders
5.5 Conclusions
6 Artificial Intelligence Crime
6.1 Introduction: A Glimmer of an Economic Theory of AI Crime
6.2 Matters of Mens Rea
6.2.1 Overview
6.2.2 Responsibility of Machines
6.2.3 Responsibility of Humans
6.2.3.1 The DNA of Negligence
6.2.3.2 Human Oversight and Human in the Loop: Begging the Question?
6.2.3.3 Negligence Failures
6.2.3.4 It's All about the Data
6.3 Matters of Actus Reus
6.3.1 The Act
6.3.2 Failures of Causation
6.3.2.1 The "Many Hands Problem"
6.3.2.2 The Black Box Problem
6.3.2.3 The Shortcuts Problem
6.3.2.4 Omissions to Act
6.4 Corporate Criminal Liability for Automated Decisions
6.4.1 Models of Corporate Criminal Liability (CCL)
6.4.2 The Next Frontier? Diamantis' Theory of Corporate Criminal Liability for Automated Decisions
6.5 Conclusions
7 Overview of Existing Legal Frameworks on AI Criminal Liability
7.1 Introduction
7.2 General Scope Tools
7.3 Self-Driving Tragedies: AV-Specific Tools
7.4 Conclusions
8 Conclusions
8.1 Incipit
8.2 The Definitional Question
8.3 A Mare Magnum of Scholarly Literature. The Introspective Question
8.4 Anthropocentrism and Responsibility of Machines. The Attribution Question.

8.4.1 Holding AI to a Higher (Moral) Standard
8.4.1.2 The (Ir) Relevance of Motives
8.4.2 Retributivists at Heart?
8.4.3 Re-evaluating the Comparison between AI and Corporations
8.4.4 Epicenters of Liability: the Human Culprit
8.5 General Conclusions. The Future- and Backward-Facing Question
8.5.1 Looking Forward
8.5.2 Looking Backwards
Impact Statement
Index of Figures
Bibliography
Biography.