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000336391 035__ $$a(OCoLC)ocn495792643
000336391 035__ $$a336391
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000336391 043__ $$aa-af---
000336391 049__ $$aISEA
000336391 050_4 $$aUB251.A3$$bF59 2010
000336391 1001_ $$aFlynn, Michael T.
000336391 24510 $$aFixing intel$$h[electronic resource] :$$ba blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan /$$cby Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor.
000336391 260__ $$aWashington, DC :$$bCenter for a New American Security,$$c2010.
000336391 300__ $$a26 p. :$$bdigital, PDF file
000336391 4901_ $$aWorking paper
000336391 500__ $$aTitle from PDF title page (viewed on January 5, 2010).
000336391 500__ $$a"Voices from the field."
000336391 500__ $$a"January 2010."
000336391 500__ $$aSeries from web site.
000336391 500__ $$aPreserved in the OCLC Digital Archive. Harvested from http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf on Jan. 5, 2010.
000336391 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 25-26).
000336391 5050_ $$aExecutive summary -- All politics is local : tactical intel equals strategic intel -- Intel at the grassroots : the battalion and below -- Regiments and brigades must fight to be relevant -- COIN warfare calls for COIN analysts -- Stability operations information centers -- Information at the regional commands -- Conclusion.
000336391 520__ $$a"This paper ... critically examines the relevance of the U.S. intelligence community to counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Based on discussions with hundreds of people inside and outside the intelligence community, it recommends sweeping changes to the way the intelligence community thinks about itself -- from a focus on the enemy to a focus on the people of Afghanistan. The paper argues that because the United States has focused the overwhelming majority of collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade. This problem or its consequences exist at every level of the U.S. intelligence hierarchy, and pivotal information is not making it to those who need it. The answer is to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers. This need spans the 44 nations involved with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This paper is the blueprint for that process. It describes the problem, details the changes and illuminates examples of units that are "getting it right." It is aimed at commanders as well as intelligence professionals, in Afghanistan and in the United States and Europe."--P. 4.
000336391 538__ $$aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
000336391 538__ $$aMode of access: World Wide Web.
000336391 650_0 $$aMilitary intelligence$$zAfghanistan.
000336391 650_0 $$aAfghan War, 2001-$$xMilitary intelligence.
000336391 650_0 $$aIntelligence service$$zUnited States.
000336391 650_0 $$aInformation warfare.
000336391 7001_ $$aPottinger, Matt.
000336391 7001_ $$aBatchelor, Paul.
000336391 7102_ $$aCenter for a New American Security.
000336391 830_0 $$aWorking paper (Center for a New American Security)
000336391 85280 $$bedoc$$hCenter for a New American Security
000336391 85640 $$zOnline access$$uhttp://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf
000336391 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:336391$$pGLOBAL_SET
000336391 980__ $$aEGOV
000336391 980__ $$aBIB
000336391 983__ $$aOnline