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Table of Contents
1: The evolution of social learning
Social learning and adaptation
Why does culture increase human adaptability?
Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare
Climate, culture, and the evolution of cognition
Norms and bounded rationality
2: Ethnic groups and markers
The evolution of ethnic markers
Shared norms and the evolution of ethnic markers / with Richard McElreath
3: Human cooperation, reciprocity, and group selection
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Why people punish defector: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas / with Joseph Henrich
Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? an empirical test / with Joseph Soltis
Group-beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population
The evolution of altruistic punishment / with Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles
Cultural evolution of human cooperation / with Joseph Henrich
4: Archaeology and culture history
How microevolutionary processes give rise to history
Are cultural phylogenies possible? / with Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, William H. Durham
Was agriculture impossible during the Pleistocene but mandatory during the Holocene? a climate change hypothesis / with Robert L. Bettinger
5: Links to other disciplines
Rationality, imitation, and tradition
Simple models of complex phenomena: the case of cultural evolution
Memes: universal acid or a better mousetrap?
Social learning and adaptation
Why does culture increase human adaptability?
Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is rare
Climate, culture, and the evolution of cognition
Norms and bounded rationality
2: Ethnic groups and markers
The evolution of ethnic markers
Shared norms and the evolution of ethnic markers / with Richard McElreath
3: Human cooperation, reciprocity, and group selection
The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Why people punish defector: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas / with Joseph Henrich
Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? an empirical test / with Joseph Soltis
Group-beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population
The evolution of altruistic punishment / with Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles
Cultural evolution of human cooperation / with Joseph Henrich
4: Archaeology and culture history
How microevolutionary processes give rise to history
Are cultural phylogenies possible? / with Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, William H. Durham
Was agriculture impossible during the Pleistocene but mandatory during the Holocene? a climate change hypothesis / with Robert L. Bettinger
5: Links to other disciplines
Rationality, imitation, and tradition
Simple models of complex phenomena: the case of cultural evolution
Memes: universal acid or a better mousetrap?