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000381637 035__ $$a(MiAaPQ)EBC3014487
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000381637 035__ $$a(OCoLC)694141168
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000381637 050_4 $$aJC598$$b.D33 2006
000381637 1001_ $$aDabla-Norris, Era.
000381637 24510 $$aWhat transparency can do when incentives fail:$$ban analysis of rent capture /$$cprepared by Era Dabla-Norris and Elisabeth Paul.
000381637 260__ $$aWashington, D.C. :$$bInternational Monetary Fund, Middle East and Central Asia Dept.,$$cc2006.
000381637 300__ $$a33 p. :$$bill.
000381637 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000381637 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000381637 338__ $$aonline resource$$2rdacarrier
000381637 4901_ $$aIMF working paper ;$$vWP/06/146
000381637 500__ $$a"June 2006."
000381637 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000381637 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000381637 650_0 $$aCorruption$$zDeveloping countries$$xPrevention$$xEconometric models.
000381637 650_0 $$aRent (Economic theory)$$xEconometric models.
000381637 650_0 $$aTransparency in government$$xEconometric models.
000381637 655_0 $$aElectronic books
000381637 7001_ $$aPaul, Elisabeth.
000381637 7102_ $$aInternational Monetary Fund.$$bMiddle East and Central Asia Dept.
000381637 830_0 $$aIMF working paper ;$$vWP/06/146.
000381637 852__ $$bebk
000381637 85640 $$3ProQuest Ebook Central Academic Complete $$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usiricelib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3014487$$zOnline Access
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000381637 980__ $$aBIB
000381637 980__ $$aEBOOK
000381637 982__ $$aEbook
000381637 983__ $$aOnline