Goal-independent central banks: why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
2006
HG1811 .C76 2006
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Title
Goal-independent central banks: why politicians decide to delegate / prepared by Christopher Crowe.
Author
Publication Details
[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Language
English
Description
41 p.
Call Number
HG1811 .C76 2006
Note
"November 2006."
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Series
IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.
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