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000401888 035__ $$a(OCoLC)939263558
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000401888 050_4 $$aHD2763 -- N45 1999eb
000401888 08204 $$a363.6
000401888 1001_ $$aNewbery, David M.
000401888 24510 $$aPrivatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities.
000401888 260__ $$aCambridge :$$bMIT Press,$$c2015.
000401888 300__ $$a1 online resource (479 pages)
000401888 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000401888 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000401888 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000401888 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000401888 520__ $$aNetwork utilities, such as electricity, telephones, and gas, are public utilities that require a fixed network to deliver their services. Because consumers have no choice of network, they risk exploitation by network owners. Once invested, however, a network's capital is sunk, and the bargaining advantage shifts from investor to consumer. The investor, fearing expropriation, may be reluctant to invest. The tension between consumer and investor can be side-stepped by state ownership. Alternatively, private ownership and consumers' political power can be reconciled through regulation. Either way, network utilities operate under terms set by the state. David Newbery argues that price-setting rules comprise only part of the policy agenda. Network utilities pose special problems of ownership and regulation. He discusses the history of ownership and regulation, privatization, and theories of regulation. Examining three network utilities in detail--telecoms, electricity, and gas--he contrasts the regulatory approaches of Britain and the United States. He also looks at liberalization in a variety of other countries. History shows that the mature forms of regulatory institutions are emarkably similar under both public and private ownership. This raises obvious questions such as: Will the forces that caused convergence to regulated vertical integration in the past reassert themselves? Can the benefits of competition be protected against the pressure to reintegrate? Will different utilities differ in their form and structure? A full understanding of the forces shaping regulatory institutions is necessary to answer these important questions.
000401888 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
000401888 650_0 $$aPublic utilities.
000401888 650_0 $$aPrivatization.
000401888 650_0 $$aPublic utilities$$xGovernment policy.
000401888 653__ $$aINFORMATION SCIENCE/Technology & Policy
000401888 653__ $$aECONOMICS/Industrial Organization
000401888 655_0 $$aElectronic books
000401888 852__ $$bebk$$hMIT Press
000401888 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5579.001.0001$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
000401888 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
000401888 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:401888$$pGLOBAL_SET
000401888 980__ $$aBIB
000401888 980__ $$aEBOOK
000401888 982__ $$aEbook
000401888 983__ $$aOnline