000428250 000__ 06372cam\a2200421\a\4500
000428250 001__ 428250
000428250 005__ 20210513150604.0
000428250 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\
000428250 007__ cr\cn\nnnunnun
000428250 008__ 111118s2011\\\\njuad\\\sb\\\\001\0\eng\d
000428250 010__ $$z  2010046861
000428250 020__ $$a9781400838837$$q(electronic book)
000428250 020__ $$z9780691151250
000428250 035__ $$a(OCoLC)ocn729378027
000428250 035__ $$a(MiAaPQ)EBC686413
000428250 035__ $$a(CaPaEBR)ebr10467758
000428250 040__ $$aCaPaEBR$$cCaPaEBR
000428250 05014 $$aHD2961$$b.B687 2011eb
000428250 08204 $$a302.1/4$$222
000428250 1001_ $$aBowles, Samuel.
000428250 24512 $$aA cooperative species$$h[electronic resource] :$$bhuman reciprocity and its evolution /$$cSamuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis.
000428250 260__ $$aPrinceton, N. J.  :$$bPrinceton University Press,$$cc2011.
000428250 300__ $$a1 online resource (xii, 262 p.) :$$bill., maps
000428250 500__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
000428250 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 225-249) and indexes.
000428250 5050_ $$a1. A cooperative species -- 2. The evolution of altruism in humans. Preferences, beliefs, and constraints ; Social preferences and social dilemmas ; Genes, culture, groups, and institutions -- 3. Social preferences. Strong reciprocity is common ; Free-riders undermine cooperation ; Altruistic punishment sustains cooperation ; Effective punishment depends on legitimacy ; Purely symbolic punishment is effective ; People punish those who hurt others ; Social preferences are not irrational ; Culture and institutions matter ; Behavior is conditioned on group membership ; People enjoy cooperating and punishing free-riders ; Social preferences in laboratory and natural settings ; Competing explanations -- 4. The sociobiology of human cooperation. Inclusive fitness and human cooperation ; Modeling multi-level selection ; Equilibrium selection ; Reciprocal altruism ; Reciprocal altruism in large groups ; Reputation : indirect reciprocity ; Altruism as a signal of quality ; Positive assortment ; Mechanisms and motives -- 5. Cooperative Homo economicus. Folk theorems and evolutionary dynamics ; The folk theorem with imperfect public information ; The folk theorem with private information ; Evolutionarily irrelevant equilibria ; Social norms and correlated equilibria ; The missing choreographer -- 6. Ancestral human society. Cosmopolitan ancestors ; Genetic evidence ; Prehistoric warfare ; The foundations of social order ; The crucible of cooperation -- 7. The coevolution of institutions and behaviors. Selective extinction ; Reproductive leveling ; Genetic differentiation between groups ; Deme extinction and the evolution of altruism ; The Australian laboratory ; The coevolution of institutions and altruism ; Simulating gene-culture coevolution ; Levelers and warriors -- 8. Parochialism, altruism, and war. Parochial altruism and war ; The emergence of parochial altruism and war ; Simulated and experimental parochial altruism ; The legacy of a past "red in tooth and claw" -- 9. The evolution of strong reciprocity. Coordinated punishment ; Altruistic punishment in a realistic demography ; The emergence of strong reciprocity ; Why coordinated punishment succeeds ; A decentralized social order -- 10. Socialization. Cultural transmission ; Socialization and the survival of fitness-reducing norms ; Genes, culture, and the internalization of norms ; The internalized norm as hitchhiker ; The gene-culture coevolution of a fitness-reducing norm ; How can internalized norms be altruistic? ; The programmable brain -- 11. Social emotions. Reciprocity, shame, and punishment ; The evolution of social emotions ; The "great captains of our lives" -- 12. Human cooperation and its evolution. The origins of human cooperation ; The future of cooperation -- Appendixes. A1. Altruism defined ; A2. Agent-based models ; A3. Game theory ; A4. Dynamical systems ; A5. The replicator dynamic ; A6. Continuation probability and time discount factor ; A7. Alternatives to the standing model ; A8. The prisoner's dilemma with public and private signals ; A9. Student and nonstudent experimental subjects ; A10. The price equation ; A11. Weak multi-level selection ; A12. Cooperation and punishment with quorum sensing.
000428250 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000428250 520__ $$aWhy do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment.  Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition,  A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.
000428250 650_0 $$aCooperation.
000428250 650_0 $$aCooperativeness.
000428250 650_0 $$aBehavior evolution.
000428250 650_0 $$aSocial evolution.
000428250 650_0 $$aAltruism.
000428250 7001_ $$aGintis, Herbert.
000428250 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aBowles, Samuel.$$tCooperative species.$$dPrinceton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 2011$$z9780691151250$$w(DLC) 2010046861$$w(OCoLC)681536381
000428250 8520_ $$bacq
000428250 85280 $$bebk$$hProQuest Ebook Central
000428250 85640 $$3ProQuest Ebook Central$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usiricelib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=686413$$zOnline Access
000428250 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:428250$$pGLOBAL_SET
000428250 980__ $$aEBOOK
000428250 980__ $$aBIB
000428250 982__ $$aEbook
000428250 983__ $$aOnline