000453847 000__ 03940cam\a2200361\a\4500 000453847 001__ 453847 000453847 005__ 20210513160114.0 000453847 008__ 111209s2012\\\\nyua\\\\\b\\\\001\0\eng\\ 000453847 010__ $$a 2011049486 000453847 020__ $$a9780199829583 (alk. paper) 000453847 020__ $$a0199829586 (alk. paper) 000453847 035__ $$a(OCoLC)ocn768335751 000453847 035__ $$a453847 000453847 040__ $$aDLC$$beng$$cDLC$$dYDX$$dBTCTA$$dYDXCP$$dOCLCO$$dUKMGB$$dCDX$$dBWX$$dCOO$$dMUU$$dPUL 000453847 042__ $$apcc 000453847 043__ $$an-us--- 000453847 049__ $$aISEA 000453847 05000 $$aHD4965.5.U6$$bK65 2012 000453847 08200 $$a331.2/164$$223 000453847 1001_ $$aKolb, Robert W.,$$d1949- 000453847 24510 $$aToo much is not enough :$$bincentives in executive compensation /$$cRobert W. Kolb. 000453847 260__ $$aNew York :$$bOxford University Press,$$cc2012. 000453847 300__ $$axi, 216 p. :$$bill. ;$$c25 cm. 000453847 4901_ $$aFinancial Management Association survey and synthesis series 000453847 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index. 000453847 5050_ $$aThe Magnitude and Structure of Executive Compensation -- Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation -- The Incentive Structure of Executive Compensation -- Executive Stock Options and the Incentives They Create -- Executive Stock Option Programs: The Behavior of CEOs, Firms, and Investors -- Executive Incentives and Risk-Taking -- Incentive Compensation and the Management of the Firm -- Perverse Incentive Effects: Executives Behaving Badly -- Incentives in Executive Compensation: A Final Assessment. 000453847 520__ $$a"The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or the attempted setting of incentives) and the behavior that is actually adduced. From this literature, there are several reasons for believing that one can set incentives in executive compensation with a high rate of success in guiding CEO behavior, and one might expect CEO compensation to be a textbook example of the successful use of incentives. Also, as executive compensation has been studied intensively in the academic literature, we might also expect the success of incentive compensation to be well-documented. Historically, however, this has been very far from the case. In Too Much Is Not Enough, Robert W. Kolb studies the performance of incentives in executive compensation across many dimensions of CEO performance. The book begins with an overview of incentives and unintended consequences. Then it focuses on the theory of incentives as applied to compensation generally, and as applied to executive compensation particularly. Subsequent chapters explore different facets of executive compensation and assess the evidence on how well incentive compensation performs in each arena. The book concludes with a final chapter that provides an overall assessment of the value of incentives in guiding executive behavior. In it, Kolb argues that incentive compensation for executives is so problematic and so prone to error that the social value of giving huge incentive compensation packages is likely to be negative on balance. In focusing on incentives, the book provides a much sought-after resource, for while there are a number of books on executive compensation, none focuses specifically on incentives. Given the recent fervor over executive compensation, this unique but logical perspective will garner much interest. And while the literature being considered and evaluated is technical, the book is written in a non-mathematical way accessible to any college-educated reader."--Publisher's website. 000453847 650_0 $$aExecutives$$xSalaries, etc.$$zUnited States. 000453847 650_0 $$aIncentives in industry$$zUnited States. 000453847 650_0 $$aIncentive awards$$zUnited States. 000453847 650_0 $$aCorporate governance$$zUnited States. 000453847 650_0 $$aExecutives$$xSalaries, etc.$$xGovernment policy$$zUnited States. 000453847 830_0 $$aFinancial Management Association survey and synthesis series. 000453847 85200 $$bgen$$hHD4965.5.U6$$iK65$$i2012 000453847 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:453847$$pGLOBAL_SET 000453847 980__ $$aBIB 000453847 980__ $$aBOOK