@article{695581,
      recid = {695581},
      author = {Drescher, Frederik,},
      title = {Insolvency timing and managerial decision-making  [electronic resource]  /},
      school = {Ph.D.},
      pages = {1 online resource.},
      abstract = {Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory  insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (18  InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an  agency problem between owners and management. Using a  decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a  tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it  experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive  instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency  filings. Contents Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem  Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing Managerial  Insolvency Timing Decision Experimental Testing of Interest  Alignment Instruments Target Groups Researchers and  students in the field of business economics with a focus on  corporate restructuring and decision theory Practitioners  in corporate restructuring and insolvency professionals,  managers and company owners.},
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/695581},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-02819-0},
}