Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law [electronic resource]. Volume I, Basic concepts and economics- based legal analyses of oligopolistic and predatory conduct / Richard Markovits.
Markovits, Richard S., author.
2014
KJE6536
Available Online

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Title Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law [electronic resource]. Volume I, Basic concepts and economics- based legal analyses of oligopolistic and predatory conduct / Richard Markovits.
Author Markovits, Richard S., author.
ISBN 9783642243073 electronic book
364224307X electronic book
9783642243066
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3
Published Berlin ; London : Springer, 2014.
Language English
Description 1 online resource.
Item Number 10.1007/978-3-642-24307-3 doi
Call Number KJE6536
Dewey Decimal Classification 343.40721
Summary This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses eachs determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firms economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firms economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of oligopolistic conduct that some economists have implicitly usedconduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrators belief that its rivals responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conductcontrived and naturalby whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses implications for eachs antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.
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Available in Other Form Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law. Volume I.
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Foreword to the Two-Volume Series
Introduction to This Study
Introduction to Part I: Basic Concepts and Approaches
Chapter 1: The Correct Definition of the Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency
Chapter 2: The Components of the Difference Between a Firms Price and Conventional Marginal Costs and the Intermediate Determinants of the Intensity of Quality-and-Variety-Increasing-Investment Competition
Chapter 3: The Definitions of Monopolizing Conduct, Attempts to Monopolize, and Exclusionary Abuses
Chapter 4: The Conduct-Coverage of, Tests of Legality Promulgated by, and Defenses (U.S. Spelling) or Defences (British Spelling) Recognized by U.S. Antitrust Law and E.C./E.U. Competition Law
Chapter 5: The Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains Whose Generation by Business Conduct Respectively Are and Are Not Relevant to the Conducts Antitrust Legality
Chapter 6: The Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions and the Unjustifiability of Market-Oriented Antitrust Analyses
Chapter 7: Economic and Antitrust Markets: Their Abstract Definition, Their Delimitability, and the Methods That Have Been Proposed and Used to Identify Concrete Exemplars
Chapter 8: The Operational Definition of A Firms Monopoly Power, Oligopoly Power, and Total (Market) Power in a Given ARDEPPS
Chapter 9: The Need to Analyze Separately the Monopolizing Character, Abusiveness, Competitive Impact, and Economic Efficiency of Business Choices
Conclusion to Part I
Introduction to Part II
Chapter 10: Oligopolistic Conduct
Chapter 11: Predatory Conduct.

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