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000705370 020__ $$a9783642243134$$qelectronic book
000705370 020__ $$a3642243134$$qelectronic book
000705370 020__ $$z9783642243127
000705370 020__ $$z3642243126
000705370 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-642-24313-4$$2doi
000705370 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)ocn880689937
000705370 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)880689937
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000705370 043__ $$ae------$$an-us---
000705370 049__ $$aISEA
000705370 050_4 $$aKJE6536
000705370 08204 $$a343.40721$$223
000705370 1001_ $$aMarkovits, Richard S.,$$eauthor.
000705370 24510 $$aEconomics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law$$h[electronic resource].$$nVolume II,$$pEconomics-based legal analyses of mergers, vertical practices, and joint ventures /$$cRichard Markovits.
000705370 24630 $$aEconomics-based legal analyses of mergers, vertical practices, and joint ventures
000705370 264_1 $$aBerlin ;$$aLondon :$$bSpringer,$$c2014.
000705370 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000705370 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000705370 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000705370 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000705370 500__ $$aIncludes index.
000705370 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000705370 520__ $$aVolume 2 uses the economic and legal concepts/theories of Volume 1 to (1) analyze the U.S. and E.U. antitrust legality of mergers, joint ventures, and the pricing-technique and contractual/sales-policy distributor-control surrogates for vertical integration and (2) assess related positions of scholars and U.S. and E.U. antitrust officials. Its analysis of horizontal mergers (1) delineates non-market-oriented protocols for determining whether they manifest specific anticompetitive intent, would lessen competition, or are rendered lawful by the efficiencies they would generate, (2) criticizes the U.S. courts traditional market-share/market-concentration protocol, the HHI-oriented protocols of the 1992 U.S. DOJ/FTC Guidelines and the European Commission (EC) Guidelines, and the various non-market-oriented protocols the DOJ/FTC have increasingly been using, (3) argues that, although the 2010 U.S. Guidelines and DOJ/FTC officials discuss market definition as if it matters, those Guidelines actually reject market-oriented approaches, and (4) reviews the relevant U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of conglomerate mergers (1) shows that they can perform the same legitimate and competition-increasing functions as horizontal mergers and can yield illegitimate profits and lessen competition by increasing contrived oligopolistic pricing and retaliation barriers to investment, (2) analyzes the determinants of all these effects, and (3) assesses limit-price theory, the toe-hold-merger doctrine, and U.S. and E.U. case-law. Its analysis of vertical conduct (1) examines the legitimate functions of each type of such conduct, (2) delineates the conditions under which each manifests specific anticompetitive intent and/or lessens competition, and (3) assesses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. Its analysis of joint ventures (1) explains that they violate U.S. law only when they manifest specific anticompetitive intent while they violate E.U. law either for this reason or because they lessen competition, (2) discusses the meaning of an ancillary restraint and demonstrates that whether a joint-venture agreement would be illegal if it imposed no restraints and whether any restraints imposed are ancillary can be determined only through case-by-case analysis, (3) explains why scholars and officials overestimate the economic efficiency of R&D joint ventures, and (4) discusses related U.S. and E.U. case-law and DOJ/FTC and EC positions. The studys Conclusion (1) reviews how its analyses justify its innovative conceptual systems and (2) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust law as written and as applied. .
000705370 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
000705370 650_0 $$aAntitrust law$$xEconomic aspects$$zEurope.
000705370 650_0 $$aAntitrust law$$xEconomic aspects$$zUnited States.
000705370 650_0 $$aAntitrust law$$zEurope.
000705370 650_0 $$aAntitrust law$$zUnited States.
000705370 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aMarkovits, Richard S.$$tEconomics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law. Volume II$$z9783642243127$$w(OCoLC)766342631
000705370 85280 $$bebk$$hSpringerLink
000705370 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24313-4$$zOnline Access
000705370 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:705370$$pGLOBAL_SET
000705370 980__ $$aEBOOK
000705370 980__ $$aBIB
000705370 982__ $$aEbook
000705370 983__ $$aOnline
000705370 994__ $$a92$$bISE