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Table of Contents
Foreword; Acknowledgements; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Abbreviations; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Relevance and Research Coverage; 1.2 Research Questions; 1.3 Structure of the Dissertation; 2 Theoretical Foundation; 2.1 Family Firms; 2.1.1 Definition of a Family Firm; 2.1.2 Heterogeneity of Family Firms; 2.2 Outside Directors; 2.2.1 Tasks and Compensation; 2.2.2 Legal Specifics; 2.3 Theories About Family Firms; 2.3.1 Agency Theory; 2.3.2 Stewardship Theory; 2.3.3 Perspective of Socioemotional Wealth; 3 Dataset and Method; 3.1 Construction of the Sample
3.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Sample3.3 The Family Firm Subsample; 3.4 Method; 3.4.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression; 3.4.2 Logistic Regression; 4 Appreciating Monitoring Activities
An Analysis of Outside DirectorCompensation in Public Family Firms40; 4.1 Abstract; 4.2 Introduction; 4.3 Theoretical Background; 4.3.1 Agency Problems and the Need for Monitoring; 4.3.2 Outside Directors; 4.3.3 Monitoring Capabilities; 4.3.4 Agency Problems in Public Family Firms; 4.3.5 Stewardship Theory; 4.3.6 Perspective of Socioemotional Wealth; 4.4 Hypotheses Development
4.4.1 Family versus Non-Family Firms4.4.2 Lone-Founder Family Firms versus True Family Firms; 4.5 Methods; 4.5.1 Sample; 4.5.2 Dependent Variable; 4.5.3 Independent Variables and Moderators; 4.5.4 Control Variables; 4.6 Results; 4.7 Discussion; 4.8 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities; 4.9 Conclusion; 5 Voluntary Disclosure of Individual Outside Director Compensation in Public Family Firms44; 5.1 Abstract; 5.2 Introduction; 5.3 Theoretical Background; 5.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure
Theory, Findings, Costs and Benefits; 5.3.2 Distinguishing Family and Non-Family Firms
5.4 Hypotheses Development5.4.1 Stakeholders' Goal Divergence and the Importance of Outside Directors; 5.4.2 Alignment vs. Entrenchment Effect; 5.4.3 The FIBER Model
Explaining Goal Sets of Family Firms; 5.4.4 The Owning Family's Influence on Business Decisions; 5.4.5 Moderating Effects of Different Types of Family Firms; 5.5 Methods; 5.5.1 Sample; 5.5.2 Dependent Variable; 5.5.3 Independent Variables and Moderators; 5.5.4 Control Variables; 5.6 Results; 5.7 Discussion; 5.8 Limitations and Implications for Future Research; 5.9 Conclusion
6 Setting the Right Mix
Analyzing Outside Directors' Pay Mix in Public Family Firms526.1 Abstract; 6.2 Introduction; 6.3 Theoretical Background; 6.3.1 Outside Directors: How to Incentivize the Monitor?; 6.3.2 Idiosyncratic Characteristics of Family Firms; 6.4 Hypotheses Development; 6.4.1 Differences between Family and Non-Family Firms; 6.4.2 Distinguishing Between Different Types of Family Firms; 6.5 Methods; 6.5.1 Sample; 6.5.2 Dependent Variables; 6.5.3 Independent Variables; 6.5.4 Control Variables; 6.6 Results; 6.7 Discussion; 6.8 Limitations and Guidance for Future Research
3.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Sample3.3 The Family Firm Subsample; 3.4 Method; 3.4.1 Ordinary Least Square Regression; 3.4.2 Logistic Regression; 4 Appreciating Monitoring Activities
An Analysis of Outside DirectorCompensation in Public Family Firms40; 4.1 Abstract; 4.2 Introduction; 4.3 Theoretical Background; 4.3.1 Agency Problems and the Need for Monitoring; 4.3.2 Outside Directors; 4.3.3 Monitoring Capabilities; 4.3.4 Agency Problems in Public Family Firms; 4.3.5 Stewardship Theory; 4.3.6 Perspective of Socioemotional Wealth; 4.4 Hypotheses Development
4.4.1 Family versus Non-Family Firms4.4.2 Lone-Founder Family Firms versus True Family Firms; 4.5 Methods; 4.5.1 Sample; 4.5.2 Dependent Variable; 4.5.3 Independent Variables and Moderators; 4.5.4 Control Variables; 4.6 Results; 4.7 Discussion; 4.8 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities; 4.9 Conclusion; 5 Voluntary Disclosure of Individual Outside Director Compensation in Public Family Firms44; 5.1 Abstract; 5.2 Introduction; 5.3 Theoretical Background; 5.3.1 Voluntary Disclosure
Theory, Findings, Costs and Benefits; 5.3.2 Distinguishing Family and Non-Family Firms
5.4 Hypotheses Development5.4.1 Stakeholders' Goal Divergence and the Importance of Outside Directors; 5.4.2 Alignment vs. Entrenchment Effect; 5.4.3 The FIBER Model
Explaining Goal Sets of Family Firms; 5.4.4 The Owning Family's Influence on Business Decisions; 5.4.5 Moderating Effects of Different Types of Family Firms; 5.5 Methods; 5.5.1 Sample; 5.5.2 Dependent Variable; 5.5.3 Independent Variables and Moderators; 5.5.4 Control Variables; 5.6 Results; 5.7 Discussion; 5.8 Limitations and Implications for Future Research; 5.9 Conclusion
6 Setting the Right Mix
Analyzing Outside Directors' Pay Mix in Public Family Firms526.1 Abstract; 6.2 Introduction; 6.3 Theoretical Background; 6.3.1 Outside Directors: How to Incentivize the Monitor?; 6.3.2 Idiosyncratic Characteristics of Family Firms; 6.4 Hypotheses Development; 6.4.1 Differences between Family and Non-Family Firms; 6.4.2 Distinguishing Between Different Types of Family Firms; 6.5 Methods; 6.5.1 Sample; 6.5.2 Dependent Variables; 6.5.3 Independent Variables; 6.5.4 Control Variables; 6.6 Results; 6.7 Discussion; 6.8 Limitations and Guidance for Future Research