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Table of Contents
Preface; Contents; Contributors; About the Editors; Part I: Comprehensive Views of Japan's Fiscal Policy; Chapter 1: Fiscal Consolidation in the Political Economy of Japan; 1 Introduction; 2 Japanś Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Situation; 2.1 Japanś Fiscal Policy in 1990s; 2.2 Fiscal Policy in the 2000s; 2.3 Efficacy of Counter-Cyclical Measures; 2.4 Needs of Fiscal Consolidation; 3 Counter-Cyclical Macro Policy; 3.1 Ordinary Fluctuations and Serious Crises; 3.2 Explanations of Delay; 3.3 Political Efforts and Micro Fiscal Policy; 4 Pro-Cyclical Policy and Macroeconomic Situation
4.1 Debt Ceiling4.2 Theoretical Analysis in a Political Economy; 4.3 Second-Best Outcome; 4.3.1 Political Efforts by Two Generations in the Second Stage; 4.3.2 Debt Ceiling by the Government in the First Stage; 4.4 Income Fluctuations and Deficit Ceiling; 4.4.1 Wage Fluctuation; 4.4.2 Tax Revenue Fluctuation; 4.5 Policy Implications; 5 Consolidation Policy; 5.1 Reform of Intergovernmental Financing; 5.2 Commitment in a Political Economy; 5 Conclusion; Comment Paper to Chapter 1; References; Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Social Security Funding: Why Social VAT Reform?; 1 Introduction
2 The Model2.1 Brief Description of the Economy; 2.2 Workers and Retirees; 2.3 Social Security System; 3 Wage Tax Financing; 3.1 Policy Preferences of Retirees; 3.2 Policy Preferences of Workers; 3.3 Voting Equilibrium; 3.4 Comparative Statics; 4 Financing by Consumption Tax; 4.1 Policy Preferences of Retirees; 4.2 Policy Preferences of Workers; 4.3 Voting Equilibrium; 4.4 Comparative Statics; 5 Political Economy of Social Security Funding; 5.1 Structure-Induced Equilibria; 5.2 Formal Presentation and Simulation; 5 Concluding Remarks; Appendix1: Proof of Proposition2
Appendix2: Proof of Proposition3Appendix3: Subgame Perfection of the Equilibrium Outcomes; Comment Paper to Chapter2; References; Part II: Fiscal Problems in Japan; Chapter 3: Female Labor Supply, Social Security, and Fiscal Consolidation; 1 Introduction; 2 Background; 3 Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 The Household; 4.2 The Firm; 4.3 The Government; 4.4 Equilibrium; 5 Simulation Analysis; 5.1 Benchmark and Calibration; 5.2 Simulations; 5.2.1 Scenarios; 5.2.2 Results; 6 Discussion; 6.1 More Scenarios; 6.2 Results; Concluding Remarks; Comment Paper to Chapter3; References
Chapter 4: Fiscal Consolidation and Local Public Finances in Japan: Incentive Problems Associated with Intergovernmental Trans...1 Introduction; 2 Classification of Intergovernmental Transfers and Their Functions; 2.1 Classification of Intergovernmental Transfers; 2.2 Functions of Transfers; 2.2.1 Function 1: Adjustment of Fiscal Disparity; Adjustment of Vertical Disparity; Adjustment of Horizontal Disparity; 2.2.2 Function 2: Guarantee of Fiscal Resources; 2.2.3 Function 3: Improving Efficiency of Resource Allocation; 3 Intergovernmental Transfers in Japan
4.1 Debt Ceiling4.2 Theoretical Analysis in a Political Economy; 4.3 Second-Best Outcome; 4.3.1 Political Efforts by Two Generations in the Second Stage; 4.3.2 Debt Ceiling by the Government in the First Stage; 4.4 Income Fluctuations and Deficit Ceiling; 4.4.1 Wage Fluctuation; 4.4.2 Tax Revenue Fluctuation; 4.5 Policy Implications; 5 Consolidation Policy; 5.1 Reform of Intergovernmental Financing; 5.2 Commitment in a Political Economy; 5 Conclusion; Comment Paper to Chapter 1; References; Chapter 2: The Political Economy of Social Security Funding: Why Social VAT Reform?; 1 Introduction
2 The Model2.1 Brief Description of the Economy; 2.2 Workers and Retirees; 2.3 Social Security System; 3 Wage Tax Financing; 3.1 Policy Preferences of Retirees; 3.2 Policy Preferences of Workers; 3.3 Voting Equilibrium; 3.4 Comparative Statics; 4 Financing by Consumption Tax; 4.1 Policy Preferences of Retirees; 4.2 Policy Preferences of Workers; 4.3 Voting Equilibrium; 4.4 Comparative Statics; 5 Political Economy of Social Security Funding; 5.1 Structure-Induced Equilibria; 5.2 Formal Presentation and Simulation; 5 Concluding Remarks; Appendix1: Proof of Proposition2
Appendix2: Proof of Proposition3Appendix3: Subgame Perfection of the Equilibrium Outcomes; Comment Paper to Chapter2; References; Part II: Fiscal Problems in Japan; Chapter 3: Female Labor Supply, Social Security, and Fiscal Consolidation; 1 Introduction; 2 Background; 3 Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 The Household; 4.2 The Firm; 4.3 The Government; 4.4 Equilibrium; 5 Simulation Analysis; 5.1 Benchmark and Calibration; 5.2 Simulations; 5.2.1 Scenarios; 5.2.2 Results; 6 Discussion; 6.1 More Scenarios; 6.2 Results; Concluding Remarks; Comment Paper to Chapter3; References
Chapter 4: Fiscal Consolidation and Local Public Finances in Japan: Incentive Problems Associated with Intergovernmental Trans...1 Introduction; 2 Classification of Intergovernmental Transfers and Their Functions; 2.1 Classification of Intergovernmental Transfers; 2.2 Functions of Transfers; 2.2.1 Function 1: Adjustment of Fiscal Disparity; Adjustment of Vertical Disparity; Adjustment of Horizontal Disparity; 2.2.2 Function 2: Guarantee of Fiscal Resources; 2.2.3 Function 3: Improving Efficiency of Resource Allocation; 3 Intergovernmental Transfers in Japan