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Foreword; Preface; Contents; Contributors; Acronyms; Part I Introduction; 1 Programming Interfaces for the TPM; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Trusted Computing in the Java Environment; 1.2.1 Java for Embedded Systems; 1.3 TCG Software Architecture; 1.3.1 The TCG Software Stack; 1.3.1.1 TSS in Embedded Systems; 1.3.2 Review of Existing Java Libraries; 1.3.2.1 Trusted Computing for the Java Platform and jTSS; 1.3.2.2 TPM/J; 1.3.2.3 TPM4JAVA; 1.3.3 Other Proposed Higher Level Interfaces; 1.3.4 Findings; 1.4 API Design; 1.4.1 Goals for a Novel API; 1.4.2 Expected Developer Knowledge
1.4.3 API Scope Considerations1.5 Outline of the API; 1.6 Experience and Outlook; 1.6.1 Third Party Implementation and Teaching Experience; 1.6.2 Application in Embedded Systems; 1.6.2.1 Benchmark Platforms; 1.6.2.2 Benchmarks and Results; 1.6.2.3 Performance Discussion; 1.6.3 Compatibility with Next Generation TPMs; References; Part II Applications-Use Cases; 2 ARM℗ʼ TrustZone℗ʼ; 2.1 TrustZone Overview; 2.2 Protection Target; 2.3 Architecture; 2.3.1 The NS Bit; 2.3.2 The Monitor, World Switching and CP-15; 2.3.3 Interrupt Handling; 2.3.4 Fabric Support; 2.3.4.1 Cache Controller
2.3.4.2 Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC)2.3.4.3 Address Space Controller; 2.4 Pitfalls; 2.4.1 Leaving Debug Features Enabled; 2.4.2 Incorrect Management of the Memory System; 2.4.3 Poor Handling of Firmware or Software Verification; 2.4.4 Poorly Designed Application Interfaces; 2.4.5 Insecure Use of Shared Buffers; 2.4.6 Incorrectly Configured Bus Peripheralsand Bad Drivers; 2.5 Standardized Software Environment; 2.5.1 TrustZone Software; 2.5.2 TEE; 2.5.3 Role in Secure Boot; References; 3 Computer Security Anchors in Smart Grids: The Smart Metering Scenario and Challenges; 3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Smart Metering Scenario3.2.1 Architectural Reference: Actors and Services; 3.3 Security and Privacy Challenges; 3.3.1 Security Engineering Requirements; 3.4 System Services; 3.5 Standardization Activities and Related works; References; 4 Authentication and Mutual Authentication; 4.1 Basics of Authentication; 4.1.1 What-You-Know; 4.1.2 What-You-Have; 4.1.2.1 Public Key Cryptography; 4.1.2.2 OTP; 4.1.3 What-You-Are; 4.1.3.1 Biometry; 4.1.3.2 Behavior; 4.1.3.3 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs); 4.1.3.4 Device Fingerprinting; 4.1.4 Credential Delivery; 4.1.4.1 Local; 4.1.4.2 In-Band
4.1.4.3 Out-of-Band4.1.5 Method Strength; 4.2 Mutual Authentication; 5 Low Power Wireless Sensor Networks: Secure Applications and Remote Distribution of FW Updates with Key Management on WSN; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Secure OTAP; 5.2.1 Introduction; 5.2.2 Actors; 5.2.3 Protocol Messages; 5.2.3.1 Firmware; 5.2.3.2 Control Information; 5.2.4 OTAP Information Dissemination; 5.2.4.1 Serving Firmware Version from OTAP Server to Gateway; 5.2.4.2 Disseminating Program Image into WSN; 5.2.4.3 Rebooting with New Firmware Version; 5.3 OTAP Partial Firmware Update; 5.3.1 Introduction
1.4.3 API Scope Considerations1.5 Outline of the API; 1.6 Experience and Outlook; 1.6.1 Third Party Implementation and Teaching Experience; 1.6.2 Application in Embedded Systems; 1.6.2.1 Benchmark Platforms; 1.6.2.2 Benchmarks and Results; 1.6.2.3 Performance Discussion; 1.6.3 Compatibility with Next Generation TPMs; References; Part II Applications-Use Cases; 2 ARM℗ʼ TrustZone℗ʼ; 2.1 TrustZone Overview; 2.2 Protection Target; 2.3 Architecture; 2.3.1 The NS Bit; 2.3.2 The Monitor, World Switching and CP-15; 2.3.3 Interrupt Handling; 2.3.4 Fabric Support; 2.3.4.1 Cache Controller
2.3.4.2 Generic Interrupt Controller (GIC)2.3.4.3 Address Space Controller; 2.4 Pitfalls; 2.4.1 Leaving Debug Features Enabled; 2.4.2 Incorrect Management of the Memory System; 2.4.3 Poor Handling of Firmware or Software Verification; 2.4.4 Poorly Designed Application Interfaces; 2.4.5 Insecure Use of Shared Buffers; 2.4.6 Incorrectly Configured Bus Peripheralsand Bad Drivers; 2.5 Standardized Software Environment; 2.5.1 TrustZone Software; 2.5.2 TEE; 2.5.3 Role in Secure Boot; References; 3 Computer Security Anchors in Smart Grids: The Smart Metering Scenario and Challenges; 3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Smart Metering Scenario3.2.1 Architectural Reference: Actors and Services; 3.3 Security and Privacy Challenges; 3.3.1 Security Engineering Requirements; 3.4 System Services; 3.5 Standardization Activities and Related works; References; 4 Authentication and Mutual Authentication; 4.1 Basics of Authentication; 4.1.1 What-You-Know; 4.1.2 What-You-Have; 4.1.2.1 Public Key Cryptography; 4.1.2.2 OTP; 4.1.3 What-You-Are; 4.1.3.1 Biometry; 4.1.3.2 Behavior; 4.1.3.3 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs); 4.1.3.4 Device Fingerprinting; 4.1.4 Credential Delivery; 4.1.4.1 Local; 4.1.4.2 In-Band
4.1.4.3 Out-of-Band4.1.5 Method Strength; 4.2 Mutual Authentication; 5 Low Power Wireless Sensor Networks: Secure Applications and Remote Distribution of FW Updates with Key Management on WSN; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Secure OTAP; 5.2.1 Introduction; 5.2.2 Actors; 5.2.3 Protocol Messages; 5.2.3.1 Firmware; 5.2.3.2 Control Information; 5.2.4 OTAP Information Dissemination; 5.2.4.1 Serving Firmware Version from OTAP Server to Gateway; 5.2.4.2 Disseminating Program Image into WSN; 5.2.4.3 Rebooting with New Firmware Version; 5.3 OTAP Partial Firmware Update; 5.3.1 Introduction