Preface ; Contents; Contributors; About the Authors; Part I ; Philosophical Problems of Normativity and Rule Following; Chapter 1; Rules, Norms and Principles: A Conceptual Framework; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 What Is a Rule?; 1.2.1 Rules as Abstract Objects; 1.2.2 Imperatival vs. Normative Content; 1.2.3 Rule-Following; 1.2.4 The Problem of Rule-Following Recast; 1.2.5 The Normativity of Rules; Conclusion ; References; Chapter 2; Separating Rules from Normativity; 2.1 Regulative and Constitutive Rules; 2.2 Three Kinds of Constitutive Rules; 2.2.1 Dynamic Rules; 2.2.2 Fact to Fact-Rules

2.2.3 Counts as-Rules2.2.4 Constitutive Rules and the Direction of Fit; 2.3 Regulative Rules; 2.3.1 Deontic Facts; 2.3.2 Rules, Facts and Descriptions; 2.3.3 Regulative Rules Are also Constitutive Rules; 2.4 Rules as Soft Constraints on Possible Worlds; 2.4.1 States of Affairs, Possible Worlds and Constraints; 2.4.2 Contraints and Directions of Fit; 2.4.3 Constraints and Conditionals; 2.4.4 Rules as Soft Constraints; 2.5 Logic for Rules; 2.5.1 No Derivation of Rules; 2.5.2 The Logic of Rule Application; Conclusion; References; Chapter 3

Communalism, Correction and Nihilistic Solitary Rule-Following Arguments3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Strategic and Dialectical Considerations; 3.2.1 The Burden of Proof; 3.2.2 Anti-communalists' Common Strategic Errors; 3.3 Sundry Considerations and Distinctions; 3.3.1 The Asymmetry Claim; 3.3.2 Possibility; 3.3.3 Conditional and Unconditional Communalism; 3.3.4 Unconditional Communalism and the Primitive Bias; 3.4 Kripke's Wittgenstein and Rule Nihilism; 3.4.1 Nihilistic and Non-nihilistic Communalism; 3.4.2 Kripkensteinian (Quasi-)Communalism; 3.4.3 The Failure of Kripke's Wittgenstein's Account

3.5 Nihilism and Non-Kripkensteinian Communalism3.5.1 Correction, Community, and Non-Kripkensteinian Nihilism; 3.5.2 Wittgenstein's 257 Principle; 3.6 Prospects for Non-nihilistic Communalism; 3.7 Some Perspective; Conclusion; References; Chapter 4; Knowing Way Too Much: A Case Against Semantic Phenomenology; References; Chapter 5; The Meaning of Normativity of Meaning; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Local and Global Constitutiveness; 5.3 Normativity of Linguistic Practice; Conclusion; References; Chapter 6; On the Kantian Answer to "Kripkenstein"'s Rule-following Paradox; 6.1 Introduction

6.2 Relations Between Hume's and Wittgenstein's Scepticism6.2.1 Old and New Scepticism of Hume; 6.2.2 Kripkenstein's Paradox in Humean Approach; 6.3 Kant as a Critic of Kripkenstein; 6.3.1 Continuity of Time and Rule-Following; 6.3.2 Transcendental Unity of Apperception as an Instance of Normativity; 6.4 "Kantstein"?; References; Chapter 7; Rules as Patterns Between Normativism and Naturalism; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Pattern-Governed Behavior; 7.3 Ought-to-be's and the Division of Labor; References; Chapter 8; Normativity and Rationality: Framing the Problem; 8.1 Introduction