The political economy of anti-dumping protection [electronic resource] : a strategic analysis / Patricia Wruuck.
2015
K4635
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Title
The political economy of anti-dumping protection [electronic resource] : a strategic analysis / Patricia Wruuck.
Author
ISBN
9783319112244 electronic book
3319112244 electronic book
9783319112237
3319112244 electronic book
9783319112237
Published
Cham : Springer, [2015]
Copyright
©2015
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xi, 167 pages) : illustrations.
Call Number
K4635
Dewey Decimal Classification
343.08/7
Summary
This book deals with anti-dumping measures (AD) and investigates two questions: First, what country characteristics affect AD use and notably, do domestic political institutions have an effect? Second, (how) is the decision to impose a new AD measure affected by anticipation of trading partnersℓ́ℓ potential retaliation? This book applies a strategic perspective to AD to address these questions, presenting a game-theoretic model together with an empirical test. The approach sheds light on the dynamics of interaction between trading partners and allows to capture selection processes which underpin the trade restrictions that can actually be observed. The book provides a fresh look on when and how trading powers apply antidumping measures, how this is shaped by strategic interaction and whether institutions do make a difference to the outcome. In a period in which the international trading system has to cope with numerous stresses such as an increased resort to administered protection largely by big emerging economies, this is a timely and important contribution. Dr. Klaus G©ơnter Deutsch, Managing Director, Research, Economic and Industrial Policy, German Federation of Industries This book successfully integrates two research traditions in international politics ℓ́ℓ the traditional view that looks at domestic factors of anti-dumping policies and the strategic view that conditions the imposition of anti-dumping measures on the likely, retaliatory behavior of the trading partner. The result is an informative and constructive examination of anti-dumping protection and trade wars in the WTO. Prof. Dr. Thomas Br©Þuninger, Chair of Political Economy, University of Mannheim, Germany "The Political Economy of Anti-Dumping Protection - A Strategic Analysis" is a major contribution to the important and growing field international political economy. Starting with the ℓ́ℓtraditionalℓ́ℓ comparative institutional analysis, which focuses on the implications of democratic and non-democratic regimes for using anti-dumping measures in trade politics, the second part applies a strategic perspective on this type of sanctions uncovering the dynamic interactions between a challenging and challenged countries. For all those interested in understanding the logic of sanctions, the role of institutions, and in how to examine the implications of theoretical models for international political economy this book is a ℓ́ℓmust read". Prof. Dr. Thomas K©œnig, Chair of Political Science II, University of Mannheim, Germany
Note
"Accepted as a dissertation at the University of Mannheim under the title "Antidumping: A Strategic View" in 2013."
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
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Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed February 20, 2015).
Series
Contributions to economics.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2. Institutions and Trade Policy {u2013} A Review
Chapter 3. Winning Coalition Size and the Use of Anti-dumping
Chapter 4. A Strategic Analysis of Anti-dumping
Chapter 5. Concluding Remarks
Appendix.
Chapter 2. Institutions and Trade Policy {u2013} A Review
Chapter 3. Winning Coalition Size and the Use of Anti-dumping
Chapter 4. A Strategic Analysis of Anti-dumping
Chapter 5. Concluding Remarks
Appendix.