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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments; Contents; Figure; Tables; 1 Introduction; 1.1 The Argument: Individual Choice and State Accumulation; 1.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization; 1.2.1 Outcomes of Mobilization; 1.2.2 Perception of Foreign Threats; 1.2.3 Domestic Institutions; 1.3 Case Selection; 1.4 Nationalism in Present-Day China; 1.5 Book Organization; References; 2 Explaining State-Led Nationalist Movements: Individual Choice and State Mobilization; 2.1 Situating the Theory; 2.1.1 Rational Elites, Emotional Masses; 2.1.2 Is a Mass-Based Instrumentalist Explanation Possible?
2.1.3 Self-interests and Group Interests2.2 Explaining Mass Nationalist Movements; 2.2.1 Assumptions; 2.2.2 Why Does Nationalism Matter?; 2.2.3 Explaining Participation: What Motivates Individuals to Participate?; 2.2.3.1 Protection; 2.2.3.2 Immediate Economic Payoffs; 2.2.3.3 Future Economic Payoffs; 2.2.4 Explaining Mobilization; 2.2.5 Bringing the Two Components Together; 2.2.5.1 Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-majority Institutions, and Successful Mobilization; 2.2.5.2 Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority/Pro-state Institutions, and the Limited Success of Mobilization
2.2.5.3 Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-majority Institutions, and the Limited Success of Mobilization2.2.5.4 Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority/Pro-state Institutions, and Failed Mobilization; 2.3 Alternative Explanations; 2.3.1 Cultural Symbols; 2.3.2 Ethnic Animosities; 2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 The New Life Movement in Jiangxi: Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limits of Nationalism; 3.1 Is the New Life Movement a Nationalist Movement?; 3.1.1 The Rationale of the New Life Movement: From Daily Habits to National Revival; 3.1.2 Cleaning Up Cities
3.1.3 Rehabilitating the Rural Areas3.2 Assessing the Outcome of New Life Mobilization; 3.2.1 Agricultural Production; 3.2.2 State Accumulation; 3.2.3 Cleanliness and Orderliness; 3.3 The Public's Weak Perception of Foreign Threats; 3.3.1 Nationalist Mobilization Without a Foreign Enemy; 3.3.2 Effects on Mobilization; 3.3.2.1 The Urban Areas; 3.3.2.2 The Rural Areas; 3.4 The Restoration of Pro-minority Institutions; 3.4.1 Returning the Land to the Original Owners; 3.4.2 Effects on Mobilization; 3.5 Alternative Explanations; 3.5.1 Policy Implementation by Local Officials
3.5.2 Domestic Contenders3.5.3 The Superficiality of the New Life Movement; 3.5.4 Top-Down Model; 3.5.5 Customs and Cultural Symbols; 3.6 Conclusion; References; 4 Sichuan During the Sino-Japanese War: Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limited Success of Nationalist Mobilization; 4.1 The Outcome of Nationalist Mobilization: A Limited Success; 4.1.1 Industrial and Agricultural Production; 4.1.2 State Accumulation; 4.1.3 Conscription; 4.2 Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation; 4.2.1 The Industrial Relocation at the Onset of the War
2.1.3 Self-interests and Group Interests2.2 Explaining Mass Nationalist Movements; 2.2.1 Assumptions; 2.2.2 Why Does Nationalism Matter?; 2.2.3 Explaining Participation: What Motivates Individuals to Participate?; 2.2.3.1 Protection; 2.2.3.2 Immediate Economic Payoffs; 2.2.3.3 Future Economic Payoffs; 2.2.4 Explaining Mobilization; 2.2.5 Bringing the Two Components Together; 2.2.5.1 Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-majority Institutions, and Successful Mobilization; 2.2.5.2 Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority/Pro-state Institutions, and the Limited Success of Mobilization
2.2.5.3 Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-majority Institutions, and the Limited Success of Mobilization2.2.5.4 Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority/Pro-state Institutions, and Failed Mobilization; 2.3 Alternative Explanations; 2.3.1 Cultural Symbols; 2.3.2 Ethnic Animosities; 2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 The New Life Movement in Jiangxi: Weak Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limits of Nationalism; 3.1 Is the New Life Movement a Nationalist Movement?; 3.1.1 The Rationale of the New Life Movement: From Daily Habits to National Revival; 3.1.2 Cleaning Up Cities
3.1.3 Rehabilitating the Rural Areas3.2 Assessing the Outcome of New Life Mobilization; 3.2.1 Agricultural Production; 3.2.2 State Accumulation; 3.2.3 Cleanliness and Orderliness; 3.3 The Public's Weak Perception of Foreign Threats; 3.3.1 Nationalist Mobilization Without a Foreign Enemy; 3.3.2 Effects on Mobilization; 3.3.2.1 The Urban Areas; 3.3.2.2 The Rural Areas; 3.4 The Restoration of Pro-minority Institutions; 3.4.1 Returning the Land to the Original Owners; 3.4.2 Effects on Mobilization; 3.5 Alternative Explanations; 3.5.1 Policy Implementation by Local Officials
3.5.2 Domestic Contenders3.5.3 The Superficiality of the New Life Movement; 3.5.4 Top-Down Model; 3.5.5 Customs and Cultural Symbols; 3.6 Conclusion; References; 4 Sichuan During the Sino-Japanese War: Strong Threat Perceptions, Pro-minority Institutions, and the Limited Success of Nationalist Mobilization; 4.1 The Outcome of Nationalist Mobilization: A Limited Success; 4.1.1 Industrial and Agricultural Production; 4.1.2 State Accumulation; 4.1.3 Conscription; 4.2 Strong Perception of Foreign Threats and Mass Participation; 4.2.1 The Industrial Relocation at the Onset of the War