Non-cooperative game theory [electronic resource] / Takako Fujiwara-Greve.
2015
QA272.5
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Details
Title
Non-cooperative game theory [electronic resource] / Takako Fujiwara-Greve.
ISBN
9784431556459 electronic book
4431556451 electronic book
9784431556442
4431556451 electronic book
9784431556442
Published
Tokyo : Springer, 2015.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xi, 260 pages) : illustrations.
Item Number
10.1007/978-4-431-55645-9 doi
Call Number
QA272.5
Dewey Decimal Classification
519.3
Summary
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner's dilemma, chicken (hawk-dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author's own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed June 25, 2015).
Series
Monographs in mathematical economics (Springer (Firm)) ; volume 1
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