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000728095 020__ $$a9783319189024$$qelectronic book
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000728095 050_4 $$aBD161.A67
000728095 08204 $$a121$$223
000728095 1001_ $$aSchmidt, Eva,$$eauthor.
000728095 24510 $$aModest nonconceptualism$$h[electronic resource] :$$bepistemology, phenomenology, and content /$$cEva Schmidt.
000728095 264_1 $$aCham :$$bSpringer,$$c[2015]
000728095 264_4 $$c©2015
000728095 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000728095 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000728095 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000728095 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000728095 4901_ $$aStudies in brain and mind ;$$v8
000728095 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000728095 5050_ $$a1 Introduction -- 2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession -- 3 Nonconceptual Content -- 4 Arguments from Phenomenology -- 5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents -- 6 Arguments from Concept Possession -- 7 The Epistemological Objection -- 8 The Objection from Objectivity -- 9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.
000728095 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000728095 520__ $$aThe author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. The volume starts off with an explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity. Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.
000728095 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (viewed July 15, 2015).
000728095 650_0 $$aKnowledge, Theory of.
000728095 830_0 $$aStudies in brain and mind ;$$v8.
000728095 852__ $$bebk
000728095 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-18902-4$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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