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000754673 019__ $$a946787459
000754673 020__ $$a9783319280141$$q(electronic book)
000754673 020__ $$a3319280147$$q(electronic book)
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000754673 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-319-28014-1$$2doi
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000754673 08204 $$a519.3$$223
000754673 24500 $$aAdvances in dynamic and evolutionary games$$h[electronic resource] :$$btheory, applications, and numerical methods /$$cFrank Thuijsman, Florian Wagener, editors.
000754673 264_1 $$aSwitzerland :$$bBirkhäuser,$$c2016.
000754673 300__ $$a1 online resource (xvii, 319 pages) :$$billustrations.
000754673 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000754673 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000754673 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000754673 4901_ $$aAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ;$$vvolume 14
000754673 5050_ $$aPreface; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; 1 Dynamic Games with Perfect Information; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Differential Games of Pursuit; 1.3 Cooperative Multistage Games with Perfect Information; 1.4 Cooperative Differential Games; 1.4.1 Definition of Cooperative Differential Games in Characteristic Function Form; 1.4.2 The Principle of Time-Consistency (Dynamic Stability); 1.4.3 Time-Consistent Solutions; 1.4.4 Strongly Time-Consistent Solutions; 1.4.5 Terminal Payoffs; References; 2 Dynamic Admission Game into an M/M/1 Queue; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model
000754673 5058_ $$a2.2.1 The General Threshold Framework2.3 Steady State Probabilities for Threshold Policies; 2.4 The Partially Observed Control Problem; 2.4.1 The Structure of Optimal Policies; 2.4.2 Optimizing the Signal; 2.5 The Game Problem; 2.5.1 Structure of Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Numerical Examples; 2.5.3 Optimizing the Signal; 2.6 Concluding Remarks; Appendix: Uniform f-Geometric Ergodicity and the Continuity of the Markov Chain; References; 3 Methodological Issues in Analyzing Market Dynamics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Assumptions of the Dynamic Framework
000754673 5058_ $$a3.2.1 The Behavioral Implications of Markov Perfection3.3 Less Demanding Notions of Equilibria; 3.3.1 Computational Algorithm; 3.3.2 Empirical Challenges and Estimation; 3.3.3 Multiplicity of Equilibrium Policies; 3.4 Computational Results from an Example; 3.4.1 Conceptual Issues and Their Computational Analogues; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Stochastic Games with Signals; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games; 4.2.1 The Model; 4.2.2 The Value; 4.2.3 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games with Long Duration; 4.2.4 An Example: The ``Big Match''
000754673 5058_ $$a4.3 Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Signals4.3.1 The Model; 4.3.2 Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.3 A Counterexample to the Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.4 Link Between the Convergence of (vn) and (vλ); 4.4 Multiplayer Stochastic Games; 4.4.1 Asymptotic Approach; 4.4.2 Uniform Approach; 4.4.3 Multiplayer Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring; 4.4.4 Stochastic Games with Signals on the State; References; 5 Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games; 5.1 Introduction; 5.1.1 What is Evolutionary Game Theory?; 5.1.2 Two Approaches to Game Analysis; 5.1.2.1 Dynamic Analysis; 5.1.2.2 Static Analysis
000754673 5058_ $$a5.1.2.3 Dynamic Versus Static Analysis5.1.3 Two Classic Matrix Games; 5.1.3.1 The Hawk Dove Game; 5.1.3.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 5.2 Nonlinear Games; 5.2.1 Overview and General Theory; 5.2.2 Playing the Field; 5.2.3 Nonlinearity due to Non-constant Interaction Rates; 5.2.4 Nonlinearity in the Strategy of the Focal Player; 5.3 Multi-Player Games; 5.3.1 Introduction to Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.2 ESSs in Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.3 Two-Strategy Multi-Player Games; 5.4 Discussion; References; 6 A Zero-Sum Game Between the Network Designer and an Adversary in Consensus Protocols
000754673 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000754673 520__ $$aThis contributed volume considers recent advances in dynamic games and their applications, based on presentations given at the 16th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games, held July 9-12, 2014, in Amsterdam. Written by experts in their respective disciplines, these papers cover various aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. They discuss theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, issues relating to lack of information, and applications in areas such as biological or economical competition, stability in communication networks, and maintenance decisions in an electricity market, just to name a few. Advances in Dynamic and Evolutionary Games presents state-of-the-art research in a wide spectrum of areas. As such, it serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students.
000754673 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed April 13, 2016).
000754673 650_0 $$aGame theory$$vCongresses.
000754673 7001_ $$aThuijsman, F.$$q(Frank),$$eeditor.
000754673 7001_ $$aWagener, Florian,$$eeditor.
000754673 7102_ $$aInternational Society of Dynamic Games.$$bSymposium$$n(16th :$$d2014 :$$cAmsterdam, Netherlands)
000754673 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z9783319280127
000754673 830_0 $$aAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ;$$vv. 14.
000754673 852__ $$bebk
000754673 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-28014-1$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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