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Table of Contents
Introduction
On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment
On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games
On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy
Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets
Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly
Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities
Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests
Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.
On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses
Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment
On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games
On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly
Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy
Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets
Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly
Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities
Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups
On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests
Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.