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000755502 1001_ $$aBasov, Suren,$$eauthor.
000755502 24510 $$aSocial norms, bounded rationality and optimal contracts$$h[electronic resource] /$$cSuren Basov.
000755502 264_1 $$aSingapore :$$bSpringer,$$c[2016]
000755502 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000755502 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000755502 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
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000755502 4901_ $$aStudies in economic theory ;$$vvolume 30
000755502 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000755502 5050_ $$aAbstract; 1 Introduction; References; 2 Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design; 2.1 A Model of Ambiguity Aversion; 2.2 Equilibrium Theory and Ambiguity; 2.3 Ambiguity Aversion and the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem; 2.4 Ambiguity Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Contractual Incompleteness; 2.5 Some Other Economic Effects of Pessimism; 2.5.1 Robustness and Linear Contracts: Uncertainty Over Agent's Actions; 2.5.2 Monetary Equilibria with Wary Agents; 2.6 Concluding Remarks; References; 3 Evolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules; 3.1 Evolution of Preferences
000755502 5058_ $$a3.1.1 Evolution of Optimal Preferences Under Bounded Rationality3.2 Evolution of Decision Rules; 3.3 Evolution of Social Norms; 3.3.1 Evolution of Conventions with Mobile Players and Spatially Homogeneous Payoffs; 3.3.1.1 The Long-Run Outcome; 3.3.1.2 The Medium-Run Outcomes; 3.3.1.3 The Model with Spatially Heterogeneous Payoffs; 3.4 On Coevolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules; References; 4 Complexity Constraints and Optimal Contracts; 4.1 A Model of Computational Complexity; 4.1.1 A Formal Model; 4.2 A Model of Linguistic Complexity
000755502 5058_ $$a4.3 Complexity as the Number of Unforeseen Contingencies4.4 Complexity and Economics: A Summary; References; 5 Probabilistic Choice and Optimal Contracts; 5.1 Trembling Hands and Optimal Screening; 5.2 Nonlinear Pricing Under Bounded Rationality; 5.2.1 Mussa and Rosen Model Revisited; 5.2.2 Introducing Bounded Rationality in the Mussa and Rosen Model; 5.3 Bounded Rationality and the Revelation Principle; 5.3.1 A Model of Boundedly Rational Behavior; 5.3.2 The Optimal Menu of Contracts and a Comparison with Some Other Mechanisms; 5.4 Oligopoly, Bounded Rationality, and Optimal Obfuscation
000755502 5058_ $$a5.4.1 The Bertrand Model with Boundedly Rational Consumers5.5 Emotional Temperature and the Power of Optimal Incentives; 5.5.1 Optimal Emotional Temperature; 5.5.2 Effect of Emotional Temperature on the Power of Optimal Incentives; 5.6 All-Pay Auctions with Boundedly Rational Bidders; References; 6 Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts; References; 7 Social Norms and Optimal Contracts; 7.1 A Model of Reciprocal Wage Setting; 7.1.1 An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity; 7.2 When to Hire a Local?
000755502 5058_ $$a7.3 Optimal Contracting Model in a Social Environment and Trust-Related Psychological Costs7.4 High-Performance Work Systems and Interaction-Based Approach to Socioeconomic Behavior; 7.5 Social Norms and Incentives: What Have We Learned?; References; 8 Miscellaneous Models; 8.1 Monopoly Pricing with Viscous Demand and Customer Turnover; 8.1.1 A Model of Viscous Demand; 8.1.2 The Customer Turnover Rate and the Monopolist's Profits; 8.2 Auctions with Opportunistic Experts; 8.2.1 The Model; 8.3 A Model of Boundedly Rational Addiction; 8.3.1 The Model
000755502 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000755502 520__ $$aThis book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation. Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design. This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.
000755502 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (viewed June 12, 2016).
000755502 650_0 $$aContracts$$xEconomic aspects.
000755502 650_0 $$aRational expectations (Economic theory)
000755502 650_0 $$aEconomics$$xSociological aspects.
000755502 650_0 $$aEconomics$$xPsychological aspects.
000755502 650_0 $$aSocial norms$$xEconomic aspects.
000755502 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aBasov, Suren$$tSocial Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts$$dSingapore : Springer Singapore,c2016$$z9789811010392
000755502 830_0 $$aStudies in economic theory ;$$vvol. 30.
000755502 852__ $$bebk
000755502 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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000755502 980__ $$aBIB
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