Acknowledgments
Credits
List of abbreviations
Introduction
Chapter one: Varieties of Mental States
1. Sensations and perceptions
The objectivity of perceptual representation
Perceptual contents
Sensory states and sensations
2. Two kinds of propositional attitudes: dispositions and commitments
Propositional attitudes as dispositions
Propositional attitudes as commitments
3. Emotions
Emotions as sensations
Emotions as evaluative judgments
Emotions as felt bodily attitudes
Emotions as perceptions of evaluative properties
The borderline view of emotions
4. Summary
Chapter two: Varieties of Self-Knowledge
1. First personal self-knowledge
Groundlessness
Transparency
Authority
2. Counterexamples from content externalism and cognitive science?
3. Third-personal self-knowledge
4. Summary
Chapter three: Epistemically Robust Accounts
1. Inner sense theories: Armstrong and Lycan
2. Inferential theories: Gopnik and Cassam
3. Simulation-theories: Goldman and Gordon
4. Summary
Chapter four: Epistemically Weak Accounts
1. Peacocke's rational internalism
2. Burge's rational externalism
3. Evans' transparency method
3.1 Fernández' epistemic account
3.2 Moran's deliberative account
4. Summary
Chapter five: Expressivism about Self-Knowledge
1. At the origins of expressivism: Wittgenstein
2. Bar-On's neo-expressivism
3. Summary
Chapter six: Constitutive Theories
1. The left-to-right side of the Constitutive Thesis: Shoemaker
2. The right-to-left side of the Constitutive Thesis: Wright
3. The two sides of the Constitutive Thesis: Bilgrami
4. A metaphysically robust kind of constitutivism: Coliva
The first half of the constitutive thesis: transparency
Objections from empirical psychology
The second half of the constitutive thesis: authority
5. Summary
Chapter seven: Pluralism about Self-Knowledge
1. Propositional attitudes as commitments: the limits of constitutive accounts
2. Sensations, basic emotions and perceptions and perceptual experiences: constitutivism meets expressivism
Sensations
Basic emotions
Perceptions and perceptual experiences
3. Propositional attitudes as dispositions and complex emotions: third-personal self-knowledge
4. Summary
Appendix: Moore's Paradox
1. Moorean and Wittgensteinian analyses
2. The constraints on any feasible account of Moore's paradox
3. What Moore's paradox isn't about: Jane's off case
4. What Moore's paradox is about
first pass
5. What Moore's paradox is about
second pass
6. An objection
Notes
Bibliography
Name index
Subject index.