Title
How Hume and Kant reconstruct natural law [electronic resource] : justifying strict objectivity without debating moral realism / Kenneth R. Westphal.
Edition
First edition.
ISBN
9780191809200 (electronic book)
Published
Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2016.
Copyright
©2016
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (xvi, 252 pages)
Other Standard Identifiers
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198747055 doi
Call Number
B809.13 .W47 2016eb
Dewey Decimal Classification
171.2
Summary
Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies. He argues that focusing on the differences between these two accounts occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which does not depend on moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism.
Note
Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies. He argues that focusing on the differences between these two accounts occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a constructivist account of the basic principles of justice which does not depend on moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on May 4, 2016).
Reconstructing moral constructivism
Objectivity, the euthyphro question, and reconstructing natural law
Hume's construction of justice
Hume's proof of the insufficiency of moral sentiments
Kant's principles of moral constructivism
Natural law constructivism and rational justification
Constructivism, contractarianism, and basic obligations
Kant's justification of rights to usufruct
Reintegrating justice into morals.
