Free will and action explanation [electronic resource] : a non-causal, compatibilist account / Scott Sehon.
Sehon, Scott Robert, 1963- author.
2016
BJ1461 .S44 2016eb
Available Online

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Title Free will and action explanation [electronic resource] : a non-causal, compatibilist account / Scott Sehon.
Author Sehon, Scott Robert, 1963- author.
Edition First edition.
ISBN 9780191818394 (electronic book)
DOI https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495
Published Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Language English
Description 1 online resource
Item Number 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198758495 doi
Call Number BJ1461 .S44 2016eb
Dewey Decimal Classification 123.5
Summary Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue - the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behaviour is teleological rather than causal.
Note Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon addresses these key questions by focusing on an underlying issue - the nature of action explanation. He proposes a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behaviour is teleological rather than causal.
Bibliography, etc. Note Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on June 2, 2016).
Available in Other Form Free will and action explanation.
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Acknowledgments. Introduction: what's at stake in the free will debate? Part 1 The teleological account of action : Teleology and interpretation
Rationalizability and irrationality
Other objections to the teleological account
Rationalizing principles and causal explanation
Deviant causal chains
The commitments of common-sense psychology. Part 2 The teleological account of free will and responsibility : Application to free will: non-causal compatibilism
Irrational actions and freedom
Extraordinary cases
How the teleological account undermines arguments for incompatibilism
Epistemic problems for other accounts of free will
Concluding thoughts. References
Index.

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