Preface; Contents; List of Figures; Part I Islamic Finance: Rationale, History, Instruments and the Legal Framework; Reference; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Overview; 1.2 The Two Worlds of Finance; 1.3 The Rationale of Islamic Finance; 1.3.1 The Development of Islamic Banking Worldwide; 1.3.2 IBF in the Middle East; 1.3.3 IBF in South Asia; 1.3.4 IBF in the Southeast Asia; 1.3.5 IBF in Africa: Sudan; 1.3.6 IBF in European and Western Countries; 1.3.7 IBF in Australia; 1.4 Conclusions; References; 2 Islamic Financial Instruments; 2.1 Overview; 2.2 Equity-Based Instruments; 2.2.1 Mushārakah

2.2.1.1 Profit and Loss Sharing2.2.1.2 The Nature of Capital; 2.2.1.3 Management; 2.2.1.4 Termination; 2.2.2 Mudārabah; 2.2.2.1 Profit and Loss Sharing; 2.2.2.2 The Nature of Capital; 2.2.2.3 Management; 2.2.2.4 Termination; 2.3 Debt-Based Instruments; 2.3.1 Murābahah; 2.3.1.1 The Nature of Cash Flows; 2.3.1.2 The Nature of Underlying Asset; 2.3.1.3 Management; 2.3.1.4 Termination; 2.3.2 Salam; 2.3.2.1 The Nature of Cash Flows; 2.3.2.2 The Nature of the Underlying Asset; 2.3.2.3 Management; 2.3.2.4 Termination; 2.3.3 Istisnā'; 2.3.3.1 The Nature of Cash Flows

2.3.3.2 The Nature of the Underlying Asset2.3.3.3 Management; 2.3.3.4 Termination; 2.3.4 Ijarah; 2.3.4.1 The Nature of Cash Flows; 2.3.4.2 The Nature of the Underlying Asset; 2.3.4.3 Management; 2.3.4.4 Termination; 2.4 Takaful; References; 3 The Historical Roots and Evolution of Islamic Financial Thought; Part II The Law of Unexpected Consequences; References; 4 The Incidence of Taxation; 4.1 Exercises; 4.2 Bibliographic Notes; Reference; 5 The Basics of Corporate Finance: The Miller-Modigliani Theorem; 5.1 The Miller-Modigliani Theorem

5.2 Hidden Information and the Breakdown of the Miller-Modigliani Theorem5.3 Prohibition of Riba in the Light of the Miller-Modigliani Theorem; 5.4 Exercises; 5.5 Bibliographic Notes; 5.6 Unexpected Consequences of the Provisions of Islamic Law; References; Part III Game Theory and Mechanism Design; References; 6 Game Theory; 6.1 The Normal Form and the Extensive Form; 6.2 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies; 6.3 Simultaneous-Move Games of Complete Information; 6.3.1 Dominant and Dominated Strategies

6.3.1.1 Iterated Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies, Rationalizable Strategies and Common Knowledge of Rationality6.4 The Nash Equilibrium; 6.5 Simultaneous-Move Games of Incomplete Information; 6.5.1 Harsanyi's Doctrine; 7 The Revelation Principle; 7.1 Bibliographic Notes; Reference; 8 Monopolistic Screening; 8.1 The Monopolistic Screening Model with Two Types; 8.2 The Unidimensional Screening Model; 8.3 The Spence-Mirrlees Condition and Implementability; 8.4 The Concept of the Information Rent; 8.5 Three Approaches to the Unidimensional Relaxed Problem; 8.5.1 The Direct Approach