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1. How empty is mainstream philosophy?
Most recent mainstream proposals are concretely empty ideas
A working idea of concrete reality
Observing the concretely empty in some recent mainstream philosophy
Our central distinction and three that have been philosophically salient
The concretely empty, the analytically empty and mainstream philosophy
2. Promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy.
Some pretty promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy
The substantial scientiphicalism of mainstream philosophy
Memory, history and emptiness
Various specifications of scientiphicalism and various departures from scientiphicalism
Interactionist entity dualism and the problem of causal pairings
Exploring philosophical thoughts that may be analytically empty ideas
3. Thinkers and what they can think about : empty issues and individualistic powers.
Language, thought and history
Thinking about "the external world"
Earth, twin Earth and history
The banality of successfully investigating unfamiliar individuals
A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed powers
The propensity to acquire individualistic powers and its historical manifestation
A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed mental powers
Generalistic propensities to acquire real-kind directed mental powers
Wishful blindness to emptiness : Putnam's "transcendental" pronouncement
Reading modal claims substantially and widening our philosophical horizons
4. The origins of material individuals : empty issues and sequentialistic powers
The origin of a particular wooden table
Some thoughts about tables and some thoughts about shmables
Origination conditions, persistence conditions, and boxing a logical compass
A tenet of scientiphicalism : basic individuals have no "memory-like" propensity
How a wooden table could have first been made from a hunk of ice
Tood and tice, a table first made of wood and a table first made of ice
Using modal terms substantially : the case of determinism
Distinctive material objects and these objects' distinctive matter
Sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars
Wooden tables, ice, and sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars
5. The persistence of material individuals : empty issues and self-directed propensity.
Material sculptures and pieces of matter
Are there inconveniently persisting material individuals?
Pieces, lumps and hunks : a problematic plethora of persisting individuals?
Is there a plethora of extraordinary persisting individuals?
Ordinary and not so ordinary persisting material individuals
Using these sentences differently and expressing substantial ideas
Fundamentals of fundamental material persistents
6. Empty debates about material matters.
Matter distributed particulately but not even a single material individual?
Matter distributed particulately, but only a single material individual?
Matter and material objects : salient positions on empty questions
The debate about complex material individuals
An exploration of the salient debate : popular paraphrases, problematic parallels
Complex material individuals and arrangements of simple material individuals
Mereological sums of simple material individuals : fusions, fusions everywhere
Sums of simple physical entities and complex ordinary material individuals
Four distinct sorts of spatial inhabitants : material mereological sums, material arrangements, complex material objects, and (complex) ordinary individuals
Worldy appendix
Are there any concrete worlds, including even the actual world?
7. Individuals, properties and time : a few substantial thoughts and many empty ideas.
Are there really any properties or are there only all the propertied individuals?
The temporal, the empty and the substantial : First part
The temporal, the empty and the substantial : Second part
Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? First part
Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? Second part
8. What will become of us : empty issues and substantial speculations.
Locke's proposed persons
Locke's lame legacy
Beyond Locke, but not beyond philosophical thoughts both incorrect and empty
So-called commonsensical materialism
So-called commonsensical materialism and the mental problems of the many
Might you be a quite simple physical thing? If so, what will become of you?
Articulating our argument for a substantial dualist view of ourselves
How an immaterial soul may, or may not, survive the death of its body
If we should become disembodied souls, will we be experiencing souls?
If we become experiencing disembodied souls, will we be fortunate souls?
9. When will there be some serious new substantial philosophy?
Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : First part
Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : Second part
Some substantial philosophical thoughts about actual concrete reality
Scientific philosophers and serious new substantial philosophy
Philosophy may mine and refine what even the most ambitious sciences produce
Concrete reality and modest philosophy.
Most recent mainstream proposals are concretely empty ideas
A working idea of concrete reality
Observing the concretely empty in some recent mainstream philosophy
Our central distinction and three that have been philosophically salient
The concretely empty, the analytically empty and mainstream philosophy
2. Promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy.
Some pretty promising examples of concretely substantial philosophy
The substantial scientiphicalism of mainstream philosophy
Memory, history and emptiness
Various specifications of scientiphicalism and various departures from scientiphicalism
Interactionist entity dualism and the problem of causal pairings
Exploring philosophical thoughts that may be analytically empty ideas
3. Thinkers and what they can think about : empty issues and individualistic powers.
Language, thought and history
Thinking about "the external world"
Earth, twin Earth and history
The banality of successfully investigating unfamiliar individuals
A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed powers
The propensity to acquire individualistic powers and its historical manifestation
A concretely substantial possibility : individualistically directed mental powers
Generalistic propensities to acquire real-kind directed mental powers
Wishful blindness to emptiness : Putnam's "transcendental" pronouncement
Reading modal claims substantially and widening our philosophical horizons
4. The origins of material individuals : empty issues and sequentialistic powers
The origin of a particular wooden table
Some thoughts about tables and some thoughts about shmables
Origination conditions, persistence conditions, and boxing a logical compass
A tenet of scientiphicalism : basic individuals have no "memory-like" propensity
How a wooden table could have first been made from a hunk of ice
Tood and tice, a table first made of wood and a table first made of ice
Using modal terms substantially : the case of determinism
Distinctive material objects and these objects' distinctive matter
Sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars
Wooden tables, ice, and sequentialistically propensitied concrete particulars
5. The persistence of material individuals : empty issues and self-directed propensity.
Material sculptures and pieces of matter
Are there inconveniently persisting material individuals?
Pieces, lumps and hunks : a problematic plethora of persisting individuals?
Is there a plethora of extraordinary persisting individuals?
Ordinary and not so ordinary persisting material individuals
Using these sentences differently and expressing substantial ideas
Fundamentals of fundamental material persistents
6. Empty debates about material matters.
Matter distributed particulately but not even a single material individual?
Matter distributed particulately, but only a single material individual?
Matter and material objects : salient positions on empty questions
The debate about complex material individuals
An exploration of the salient debate : popular paraphrases, problematic parallels
Complex material individuals and arrangements of simple material individuals
Mereological sums of simple material individuals : fusions, fusions everywhere
Sums of simple physical entities and complex ordinary material individuals
Four distinct sorts of spatial inhabitants : material mereological sums, material arrangements, complex material objects, and (complex) ordinary individuals
Worldy appendix
Are there any concrete worlds, including even the actual world?
7. Individuals, properties and time : a few substantial thoughts and many empty ideas.
Are there really any properties or are there only all the propertied individuals?
The temporal, the empty and the substantial : First part
The temporal, the empty and the substantial : Second part
Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? First part
Is there a real need that properties (alone) suitably serve? Second part
8. What will become of us : empty issues and substantial speculations.
Locke's proposed persons
Locke's lame legacy
Beyond Locke, but not beyond philosophical thoughts both incorrect and empty
So-called commonsensical materialism
So-called commonsensical materialism and the mental problems of the many
Might you be a quite simple physical thing? If so, what will become of you?
Articulating our argument for a substantial dualist view of ourselves
How an immaterial soul may, or may not, survive the death of its body
If we should become disembodied souls, will we be experiencing souls?
If we become experiencing disembodied souls, will we be fortunate souls?
9. When will there be some serious new substantial philosophy?
Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : First part
Concretely substantial ideas about mutually isolated concrete worlds : Second part
Some substantial philosophical thoughts about actual concrete reality
Scientific philosophers and serious new substantial philosophy
Philosophy may mine and refine what even the most ambitious sciences produce
Concrete reality and modest philosophy.