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000778579 019__ $$a966429404
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000778579 1001_ $$aFischer, Bob$$q(Robert William),$$eauthor.
000778579 24510 $$aModal justification via theories /$$cBob Fischer.
000778579 250__ $$aFirst edition.
000778579 260__ $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer Nature,$$c2017.
000778579 300__ $$a1 online resource.
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000778579 4901_ $$aStudies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science ;$$vVol. 380
000778579 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000778579 5050_ $$aChapter 1. A Theory-based Epistemology of Modality -- Chapter 2. TEM's Details -- Chapter 3. Objections and Clarifications -- Chapter 4. Theory Selection -- Chapter 5. TEM and Modal Skepticism -- Chapter 6. Against Optimism -- Chapter 7. TEM and the Theoretical Virtues.
000778579 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000778579 520__ $$aThis monograph articulates and defends a theory-based epistemology of modality (TEM). According to TEM, someone justifiably believe an interesting modal claim if and only if (a) she justifiably believes a theory according to which that claim is true, (b) she believes that claim on the basis of that theory, and (c) she has no defeaters for her belief in that claim. The book has two parts. In the first, the author motivates TEM, sets out the view in detail, and defends it against a number of objections. In the second, the author considers whether TEM is worth accepting. To argue that it is, the author sets out criteria for choosing between modal epistemologies, concluding that TEM has a number of important virtues. However, the author also concedes that TEM is cautious: it probably implies that we are not justified in believing some interesting modal claims that we might take ourselves to be justified in believing. This raises a question about TEM's relationship to Peter van Inwagen's modal skepticism, which the author explores in detail. As it turns out, TEM offers a better route to modal skepticism than the one that van Inwagen provides. But rather than being a liability, the author argues that this is a further advantage of the view. Moreover, he argues that other popular modal epistemologies do not fare better: they cannot easily secure more extensive modal justification than TEM. The book concludes by clarifying TEM's relationship to the other modal epistemologies on offer, contending that TEM need not be a rival to those views, but can instead be a supplement to them.
000778579 650_0 $$aPhilosophy.
000778579 650_0 $$aKnowledge, Theory of.
000778579 650_0 $$aMetaphysics.
000778579 650_0 $$aPhilosophy and science.
000778579 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aFischer, Bob (Robert William).$$tModal justification via theories.$$bFirst edition.$$dCham, Switzerland : Springer Nature, 2017$$z3319491261$$z9783319491264$$w(OCoLC)960492835
000778579 830_0 $$aSynthese library ;$$vvol. 380.
000778579 852__ $$bebk
000778579 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-49127-1$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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