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Table of Contents
List of Figures; List of Tables; Chapter 1: Building aßCulture ofßAccountability inßService Delivery: Conclusions fromßtheßGDN Project onßVarieties ofßGovernance andßService Delivery; 1 The GDN Project onßVarieties ofßGovernance inßService Delivery; 2 Accountability, Quality andßEquity inßService Delivery; 3 Accountability andßPerformance WithinßDifferent Institutional Settings; 3.1 Accountability inßDecentralized Systems: Closer Is Not Always Better; 3.1.1 The Key Importance ofßProviders' Autonomy andßIncentives.
3.1.2 The Importance ofßLocal Taxation, Capabilities andßPolitical Competition3.2 Direct Citizens' Participation: Mimicry andßRubber Stamping or Effective Accountability?; 3.3 Accountability, Choice andßModes ofßDelivery: TheßJury Is Still Out; 4 Summing Up: Three Major Conclusions forßBuilding Accountability inßService Delivery; 4.1 Adequate Information Flows Can BeßMore thanßaßNecessary Condition forßAccountability; 4.1.1 Lack ofßAdequate Information Impairs Accountability; 4.1.2 Information Often Promotes Accountability; 4.2 Self-financing Promotes Accountability.
4.2.1 Direct Payment forßServices Enhances Accountability andßPerformance4.2.2 Payment forßServices ThroughßLocal Taxes also Enhances Accountability andßPerformance; 4.3 Political History andßCulture Have Lasting Effects onßAccountability, butßThey Can Eventually BeßOvercome ThroughßPersistent Institutional andßIncentive Reforms; 5 Ideas forßFuture Research; References; Chapter 2: Markets andßHierarchies inßPublic Services: Incentives, Institutions, andßPolitics; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical Issues: Markets, Hierarchies, andßQuasi-Markets; 3 Complementary Issues inßQuasi-Market Design.
3.1 Information3.2 Flexibility andßManagerial Autonomy; 3.3 Entry andßExit; 4 Mitigating Negative Consequences; 4.1 Incentives andßMotivations; 4.2 Equity; 4.3 Auditing, Policing, andßEnforcing; 5 Politics andßQuasi-Markets; 6 Conclusions; Bibliography; Chapter 3: Decentralization, Fiscal Effort, andßSocial Progress inßColombia at theßMunicipal Level, 1994-2009: Why Does National Politics Matter?; 1 Introduction; 2 A Short Account ofßColombia's Decentralization Reforms; 2.1 Decentralization Impact onßEducation: Better Coverage, Deficient Quality.
2.2 Decentralization Impact: Mixed Results onßtheßProvision ofßWater Services3 Conceptual Framework: TheßNecessary Link betweenßPolitical Competition, Local State Capacity, andßPolicy Outcomes; 4 Methodology; 4.1 Link betweenßPolitical Competition andßLocal State Capacity: How Often Do Mayors Update Their Municipality's Local Cadastre?; 4.2 The Effect ofßLocal State Capacity onßtheßEfficiency ofßService Provision Systems inßEducation andßWater; 4.2.1 The Model forßEnrollment Rates andßQuality ofßEducation; 4.2.2 The Model forßCoverage andßQuality ofßWater; 5 Results.
3.1.2 The Importance ofßLocal Taxation, Capabilities andßPolitical Competition3.2 Direct Citizens' Participation: Mimicry andßRubber Stamping or Effective Accountability?; 3.3 Accountability, Choice andßModes ofßDelivery: TheßJury Is Still Out; 4 Summing Up: Three Major Conclusions forßBuilding Accountability inßService Delivery; 4.1 Adequate Information Flows Can BeßMore thanßaßNecessary Condition forßAccountability; 4.1.1 Lack ofßAdequate Information Impairs Accountability; 4.1.2 Information Often Promotes Accountability; 4.2 Self-financing Promotes Accountability.
4.2.1 Direct Payment forßServices Enhances Accountability andßPerformance4.2.2 Payment forßServices ThroughßLocal Taxes also Enhances Accountability andßPerformance; 4.3 Political History andßCulture Have Lasting Effects onßAccountability, butßThey Can Eventually BeßOvercome ThroughßPersistent Institutional andßIncentive Reforms; 5 Ideas forßFuture Research; References; Chapter 2: Markets andßHierarchies inßPublic Services: Incentives, Institutions, andßPolitics; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical Issues: Markets, Hierarchies, andßQuasi-Markets; 3 Complementary Issues inßQuasi-Market Design.
3.1 Information3.2 Flexibility andßManagerial Autonomy; 3.3 Entry andßExit; 4 Mitigating Negative Consequences; 4.1 Incentives andßMotivations; 4.2 Equity; 4.3 Auditing, Policing, andßEnforcing; 5 Politics andßQuasi-Markets; 6 Conclusions; Bibliography; Chapter 3: Decentralization, Fiscal Effort, andßSocial Progress inßColombia at theßMunicipal Level, 1994-2009: Why Does National Politics Matter?; 1 Introduction; 2 A Short Account ofßColombia's Decentralization Reforms; 2.1 Decentralization Impact onßEducation: Better Coverage, Deficient Quality.
2.2 Decentralization Impact: Mixed Results onßtheßProvision ofßWater Services3 Conceptual Framework: TheßNecessary Link betweenßPolitical Competition, Local State Capacity, andßPolicy Outcomes; 4 Methodology; 4.1 Link betweenßPolitical Competition andßLocal State Capacity: How Often Do Mayors Update Their Municipality's Local Cadastre?; 4.2 The Effect ofßLocal State Capacity onßtheßEfficiency ofßService Provision Systems inßEducation andßWater; 4.2.1 The Model forßEnrollment Rates andßQuality ofßEducation; 4.2.2 The Model forßCoverage andßQuality ofßWater; 5 Results.