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Table of Contents
Dedication; Preface; Contents; List of Tables; Chapter 1: Internal Threat Alliances: AßNew Conceptual Framework; Theoretical andßPolicy Relevance; The Argument; Traditional Military Alliances; Cooperation toßBalance External Threats; Alliance Formation: External Threat toßtheßNational Interest; Bandwagoning: Either Balance or Bandwagon; Alliance Effectiveness: Sufficient Resources toßThwart aßCommon Enemy; Gap inßtheßLiterature; The Argument; Internal Threat Alliances: AßNew Conceptual Framework; Alliance Formation; Why theßWeak State's Leaders Align; Why theßGreat Power Aligns.
Why andßWhen Actors BandwagonAlliance Effectiveness: Sufficient Resources andßAbility toßCurb Subnational Bandwagoning; Lessons forßPolicy; Conclusions; Roadmap forßtheßRemainder ofßtheßBook; Notes; Chapter 2: US-Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980-2010); US-Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980-2010): Historical Overview; From theß"Brink ofßCollapse" toß"Turning theßTide"; Characteristics ofßtheßColombian State: Internal Fragmentation, Multiple Actors, andßCompeting Interests; Alliance Formation.
Profile ofßtheßInternal Threat: Insurgents andßNarco-traffickers Imperiling Regime Survival andßUS Interests Evolution ofßtheß"Narco-Guerrilla" Threat; Why theßUSA andßColombia Aligned: ToßSafeguard theßRegime and US Interests Associated With It; External andßInternal Threats (1981-1989): Reagan [USA] andßTurbay, Betancur [Colombia]; The Shift toßInternal Threat Alliance (1989-1993): Bush [US] andßBarco [Colombia]; Bandwagoning; Bandwagoning toßSurvive: Defections andßDiverting Alliance Resources; Bandwagoning forßPower andßPatron: Self-Interest OverßNational Interest.
Circumventing Bandwagoning Regime ActorsAlliance Effectiveness; "To theßBrink ofßCollapse": Low Alliance Effectiveness (1980-1998); Betancur (1982-1986): Close Alignment Morphs fromßPolitical Liability toßAsset; Barco (1986-1990): Political Interests Push Regime/USA intoß"Golden Embrace"; Gaviria (1990-1994): Cooperation Increases toßQuash "Narco-ƯTerrorism Plague"; Samper (1994-1998): Central Regime Bandwagons, Sends Alliance intoßTailspin; Alliance Effectiveness Remains Low asßSamper Steps Down; "Turning theßTide": Higher Alliance Effectiveness (1998-2010).
Uribe (2002-2010): Regime Needs Resources toßSecure (Unprecedented) Re-election Alliance Effectiveness Soars Under Pastrana, Uribe; Case Conclusions; ; Chapter 3: US-Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001-2012); US-Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001-2012): Historical Overview.
Why andßWhen Actors BandwagonAlliance Effectiveness: Sufficient Resources andßAbility toßCurb Subnational Bandwagoning; Lessons forßPolicy; Conclusions; Roadmap forßtheßRemainder ofßtheßBook; Notes; Chapter 2: US-Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980-2010); US-Colombia Internal Threat Alliance (1980-2010): Historical Overview; From theß"Brink ofßCollapse" toß"Turning theßTide"; Characteristics ofßtheßColombian State: Internal Fragmentation, Multiple Actors, andßCompeting Interests; Alliance Formation.
Profile ofßtheßInternal Threat: Insurgents andßNarco-traffickers Imperiling Regime Survival andßUS Interests Evolution ofßtheß"Narco-Guerrilla" Threat; Why theßUSA andßColombia Aligned: ToßSafeguard theßRegime and US Interests Associated With It; External andßInternal Threats (1981-1989): Reagan [USA] andßTurbay, Betancur [Colombia]; The Shift toßInternal Threat Alliance (1989-1993): Bush [US] andßBarco [Colombia]; Bandwagoning; Bandwagoning toßSurvive: Defections andßDiverting Alliance Resources; Bandwagoning forßPower andßPatron: Self-Interest OverßNational Interest.
Circumventing Bandwagoning Regime ActorsAlliance Effectiveness; "To theßBrink ofßCollapse": Low Alliance Effectiveness (1980-1998); Betancur (1982-1986): Close Alignment Morphs fromßPolitical Liability toßAsset; Barco (1986-1990): Political Interests Push Regime/USA intoß"Golden Embrace"; Gaviria (1990-1994): Cooperation Increases toßQuash "Narco-ƯTerrorism Plague"; Samper (1994-1998): Central Regime Bandwagons, Sends Alliance intoßTailspin; Alliance Effectiveness Remains Low asßSamper Steps Down; "Turning theßTide": Higher Alliance Effectiveness (1998-2010).
Uribe (2002-2010): Regime Needs Resources toßSecure (Unprecedented) Re-election Alliance Effectiveness Soars Under Pastrana, Uribe; Case Conclusions; ; Chapter 3: US-Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001-2012); US-Afghanistan Internal Threat Alliance (2001-2012): Historical Overview.