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Table of Contents
Preface; Contents; About the Editors; Contributors; 1 A Rational Approach to the Study of International Relations in Asia; 1.1 Controversies; 1.2 Medieval Cooperation from Rival Perspectives; 1.2.1 Two Research Programs; 1.2.2 Constructivist Perspective; 1.2.3 Rationalist Perspective; 1.3 Rational Analyses of Contemporary Cooperation: An Overview; 1.3.1 Security Cooperation and Conflict Management; 1.3.2 Security Cooperation and Arms Control; 1.3.3 Trade Cooperation; 1.3.4 Currency Cooperation; 1.4 Conclusion; References; Part I Security Cooperation and Conflict Management
2 Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 The Sequence of Moves and the Payoffs; 2.4 Information Structure and Beliefs; 2.5 Preliminaries; 2.5.1 Intervention Decision of Japan; 2.5.2 Resistance Decision of the U.S.; 2.5.3 Initiation Decision of the Challenger; 2.6 Equilibrium; 2.6.1 Pooling Equilibrium; 2.6.2 Separating Equilibria; 2.7 Implications; 2.7.1 Deterrence; 2.7.2 Strategic Logic of Collective Self-Defense; 2.7.3 Trust in Alliance Politics; 2.8 Conclusion; A.1 Appendix; References
3 Information Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Theories on International Disputes; 3.3 Grasping Early Stage International Disputes; 3.4 A Model; 3.5 Results; 3.6 Illustration; 3.7 Discussion; References; 4 Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations: Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck?; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 UN and Regional Peacekeeping Operations; 4.2.1 Definitions; 4.2.2 Determinants of Peacekeeping Missions; 4.2.3 Troop Contributors; 4.3 The Model; 4.3.1 Players and Actions; 4.3.2 Utilities and Preferences
Disputants D and EStates A and B; 4.3.3 Sequence of the Game; 4.4 Findings; 4.4.1 State B's Optimal Offer After mA=0 ; 4.4.2 State A's Optimal Offer; 4.4.3 State B's Optimal Offer; 4.5 Case Study; 4.5.1 Peacekeeping in Cambodia; 4.5.2 Peacekeeping in Timor Leste; 4.5.3 Peacekeeping Missions and Regional Contributions; 4.6 Conclusion; References; Part II Security Cooperation and Arms Control; 5 Politics Over the Claim of Individual Self-Defense at Wars: Aid Conditionality and Reciprocity in Asian Regional Conflict; 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Claiming the Right of Self-Defense and Political Incentives5.2.1 UN Charter Provisions Concerning the Right of Self-Defense; 5.2.2 Right of Self-Defense and Aid Conditionality; 5.2.3 Right of Self-Defense and Reciprocity; 5.2.4 Criteria for Case Selection; 5.3 Invocations of Self-Defense Right in the 2nd and 3rd Indo-Pakistani Wars; 5.3.1 History of the Second Indo-Pakistani War; 5.3.2 Diplomatic Negotiations with the States Concerned; 5.3.3 The Third Indo-Pakistani War; 5.4 Games Over Reports of the Right of Self-Defense; 5.4.1 Why Use Game Theory?
2 Signaling Game of Collective Self-Defense in the U.S.-Japan Alliance2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model; 2.3 The Sequence of Moves and the Payoffs; 2.4 Information Structure and Beliefs; 2.5 Preliminaries; 2.5.1 Intervention Decision of Japan; 2.5.2 Resistance Decision of the U.S.; 2.5.3 Initiation Decision of the Challenger; 2.6 Equilibrium; 2.6.1 Pooling Equilibrium; 2.6.2 Separating Equilibria; 2.7 Implications; 2.7.1 Deterrence; 2.7.2 Strategic Logic of Collective Self-Defense; 2.7.3 Trust in Alliance Politics; 2.8 Conclusion; A.1 Appendix; References
3 Information Sharing in Early Stage International Disputes: How China and Japan Communicate3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Theories on International Disputes; 3.3 Grasping Early Stage International Disputes; 3.4 A Model; 3.5 Results; 3.6 Illustration; 3.7 Discussion; References; 4 Peacekeeping by the UN and Regional Organizations: Sharing the Burden or Passing the Buck?; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 UN and Regional Peacekeeping Operations; 4.2.1 Definitions; 4.2.2 Determinants of Peacekeeping Missions; 4.2.3 Troop Contributors; 4.3 The Model; 4.3.1 Players and Actions; 4.3.2 Utilities and Preferences
Disputants D and EStates A and B; 4.3.3 Sequence of the Game; 4.4 Findings; 4.4.1 State B's Optimal Offer After mA=0 ; 4.4.2 State A's Optimal Offer; 4.4.3 State B's Optimal Offer; 4.5 Case Study; 4.5.1 Peacekeeping in Cambodia; 4.5.2 Peacekeeping in Timor Leste; 4.5.3 Peacekeeping Missions and Regional Contributions; 4.6 Conclusion; References; Part II Security Cooperation and Arms Control; 5 Politics Over the Claim of Individual Self-Defense at Wars: Aid Conditionality and Reciprocity in Asian Regional Conflict; 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Claiming the Right of Self-Defense and Political Incentives5.2.1 UN Charter Provisions Concerning the Right of Self-Defense; 5.2.2 Right of Self-Defense and Aid Conditionality; 5.2.3 Right of Self-Defense and Reciprocity; 5.2.4 Criteria for Case Selection; 5.3 Invocations of Self-Defense Right in the 2nd and 3rd Indo-Pakistani Wars; 5.3.1 History of the Second Indo-Pakistani War; 5.3.2 Diplomatic Negotiations with the States Concerned; 5.3.3 The Third Indo-Pakistani War; 5.4 Games Over Reports of the Right of Self-Defense; 5.4.1 Why Use Game Theory?