Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; 1 Background Introduction; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Contract Theory: Fundamentals and Classification; 1.2.1 Basic Contract Concepts; 1.2.2 Classification; 1.2.3 Models; 1.2.4 Comparisons; 1.3 Contract Theory: Reward Design; 1.3.1 Dimension of Rewards; 1.3.2 Rewards on Absolute Performance or Relative Performance; 1.3.3 Reward in Bilateral or Multilateral Contracting; 1.4 Applications in Wireless Networks; 1.4.1 Adverse Selection; 1.4.2 Moral Hazard; 1.4.3 Mixed Problem; 1.5 Summary; References

2 Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks with Adverse Selection2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Related Work; 2.3 System Model; 2.3.1 Transmission Data Rate; 2.3.2 User Equipment Type; 2.3.3 Base Station Model; 2.3.4 User Equipment Model; 2.3.5 Social Welfare; 2.4 Proposed Solution; 2.4.1 Conditions for Contract Feasibility; 2.4.2 Optimal Contract; 2.4.3 Practical Implementation; 2.5 Simulation Results and Analysis; 2.5.1 Contract Feasibility; 2.5.2 System Performance; 2.6 Summary; References; 3 Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsourcing with Moral Hazard

3.1 Introduction3.2 System Model; 3.2.1 Utility of User; 3.2.2 Utility of Principal; 3.3 Problem Formulation; 3.4 Simulation Results and Analysis; 3.4.1 Optimal Compensation Package Analysis; 3.4.2 Compensation Package Comparison; 3.5 Summary; References; 4 Tournament-Based Incentive Mechanism Designs for Mobile Crowdsourcing; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 System Model; 4.2.1 Common Shock Problem; 4.2.2 Rank-Order Statistic; 4.2.3 Utility of the Users; 4.2.4 Utility of the Principal; 4.3 Problem Formulation; 4.3.1 Optimization Problem; 4.3.2 Tournament Design; 4.4 Simulation Results and Analysis

4.4.1 Simulation Setup4.4.2 Reward by Tournament; 4.4.3 Comparison; 4.5 Summary; References; 5 Multi-dimensional Payment Plan in Fog Computing with Moral Hazard; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 System Model; 5.2.1 Operation Cost; 5.2.2 QoS Measurement; 5.2.3 Payment Plan; 5.2.4 Utility of Fog Node; 5.2.5 Utility of Network Operator; 5.2.6 Social Welfare; 5.3 Problem Formulation; 5.4 Simulation Results and Analysis; 5.5 Summary; References; 6 Financing Contract with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard for Spectrum Trading in Cognitive Radio Networks; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Related Works; 6.3 System Model

6.4 Problem Formulation6.4.1 PU's Payoff Maximization Problem; 6.4.2 Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard only; 6.4.3 Optimal Contract with Adverse Selection only; 6.4.4 Optimal Contract with both Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard; 6.5 Simulation Results and Analysis; 6.5.1 Financing Contract Analysis; 6.5.2 System Performance; 6.6 Summary; References; 7 Complementary Investment of Infrastructure and Service Providers in Wireless Network Virtualization; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 System Model; 7.2.1 Cost and Revenue Functions; 7.2.2 Shapley Value; 7.2.3 Investment Surplus; 7.3 Problem Formulation