Preface; Contents; Notations and Symbols; Abbreviations; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Motivation; 1.2 Formulating Resource Allocation Problems; 1.3 Mathematical Background; 1.3.1 Stochastic Robust Optimization; 1.3.2 Worst-Case Robust Optimization; 1.3.2.1 General Norm; 1.3.2.2 Polyhedron Model; 1.3.3 Hybrid Approach: Bounded Uncertainty and Probabilistic Constraints; 1.3.3.1 Chance-Constrained Approach; 1.3.3.2 D-Norm Approach; 1.4 Generic System Model; 1.4.1 System Model for Wireless Networks with Homogeneous Users; 1.4.2 System Model for Wireless Networks with Heterogeneous Users

1.4.2.1 Underlay Cognitive Radio Network1.4.2.2 Wireless Networks with Heterogeneous Users in Unlicensed Bands; 1.4.3 Physical Layer Security in Wireless Channels; 1.5 Cost of Robustness; 1.6 Organization of This Book; References; 2 Robust Cooperative Resource Allocation; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Single-Channel Cellular Cognitive Radio Networks; 2.2.1 Robust Problem; 2.2.1.1 Iterative Algorithm for Solving Nominal and Robust Problems; 2.2.1.2 Reduced Throughput in Robust Solution; 2.2.1.3 Distributed Robust Solutions and Extra Message Passing; 2.2.1.4 Infrequent Message Passing

2.3 Multi-channel Cognitive Radio Networks2.3.1 Robust Problems; 2.3.1.1 Social Utility of Robust Solutions Versus Uncertainty Levels; 2.3.2 Trade-Off Algorithms; 2.3.2.1 Trade-Off in D-Norm Approach; 2.3.2.2 Trade-off in Chance-Constrained Approach; 2.4 Overview of Other Works on Robust Cooperative Resource Allocation; 2.5 Concluding Remarks; Appendices; Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2.2; Appendix 2: Convexity of (9); Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 2.3; Appendix 4: Proof of Lemma 2.1; Appendix 5: Proof of Proposition 2.4; Appendix 6: Proof of Lemma 2.2; Appendix 7: Proof of Lemma 2.3

Appendix 8: Proof of Proposition 2.5References; 3 Robust Noncooperative Resource Allocation; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Overview of Nominal Noncooperative Strategic Games; 3.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of NE; 3.2.1.1 Existence of NE; 3.2.1.2 Uniqueness of NE; 3.2.1.3 Existence and Uniqueness of NE in Nominal Noncooperative Power Control Games with Homogeneous Users; 3.2.2 Social Utility (Sum Rate) at NE; 3.2.3 Distributed Algorithms; 3.3 Worst-Case Robust Power Control in Noncooperative Games; 3.3.1 Robust Power Control for Noncooperative Homogeneous Users; 3.3.1.1 Existence and Uniqueness of RNE

3.3.1.2 Social Utility (Sum Rate)3.3.1.3 Distributed Algorithms; 3.3.1.4 Overview of Other Works on Robust Noncooperative Games with Homogeneous Users; 3.3.2 Robust Power Control in Noncooperative CRNs; 3.3.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of RNE; 3.3.2.2 Social Utility (Sum Rate); 3.3.2.3 Distributed Algorithms; 3.3.2.4 Overview of Other Works on Robust Noncooperative CRNs; 3.3.3 Robust Power Control for Noncooperative Heterogeneous Users; 3.3.3.1 Robust Stackelberg Games; 3.3.3.2 Single-Leader/Single-Follower Robust Stackelberg Games; 3.3.3.3 Multi-user Stackelberg Games