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Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; List of Aside; List of Figures; List of Tables; Glossary; Chapter 1: Water Allocation: The Joint Problem of Interaction and Transaction Cost; 1.1 The Complexity of Shared Water; 1.2 The Transaction Cost of Seeking Water; 1.3 Can We Solve Water Allocation Problems by Working Better with Communities to Have Them Agree on Allocations?; 1.4 Can We Solve Water Allocation Problems with More Regulation?; 1.5 Is Infrastructure the Solution to the Problem of Water Allocation?; 1.6 Here Are the Problems with Market Approaches that Need Solving
1.7 Overview of the Smart MarketReferences; Chapter 2: Water Markets: Theory and Practice; 2.1 The Problem of Hydrological Externalities; 2.1.1 What Is an Externality?; 2.1.2 The Coase Theorem; 2.1.3 The Failure of the Coase Theorem for Water Resources; 2.2 Water Allocation by Pricing Mechanisms; 2.3 Experiences with Water Markets; 2.3.1 Chile; 2.3.2 The U.S.; 2.3.3 Australia; References; Chapter 3: How Water Flows, How It Is Modeled, and How We Can Optimize It; Aside: Groundwater Terminology; 3.1 Groundwater Flow; 3.2 Hydrological Modeling; 3.3 Optimization with Linear Programming
Aside: A Two-User Optimization of Water Use with Linear Programming3.4 Hydrological Optimization; 3.4.1 Previous Applications; 3.4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis; 3.4.3 Catchment Management Models; Aside: The WRAM Program; Aside: The CALVIN Program; 3.4.4 Key Ideas from Past Work on Hydrological Optimization; References; Chapter 4: Introduction to Smart Markets; 4.1 Analogies of Water Markets to Markets for Other Complex Commodities; 4.2 Electricity Smart Markets; 4.3 Natural Gas Smart Markets; 4.4 Precedents for Smart Markets for Water; 4.5 What Kind of Market Is a Smart Market for Water?
5.6 The Regulator Must Record and Manage Water Rights and Use5.6.1 The Regulator Must Maintain a Modern Water Rights Database; 5.6.2 The Regulator Should Redefine Initial Rights; 5.6.3 The Regulator Must Have Authority to Adjust Users ĚAllocations; 5.6.4 The Regulator Must Enforce Users ĚAllocation Limits; 5.7 The Regulator Must Grant Relevant Parties Full Legal Ability to Trade, with as Few Impediments as Reasonably Possible; References; Chapter 6: Participants in and Components of the Smart Market Institution; 6.1 The Water Regulator; 6.2 The Market Manager
1.7 Overview of the Smart MarketReferences; Chapter 2: Water Markets: Theory and Practice; 2.1 The Problem of Hydrological Externalities; 2.1.1 What Is an Externality?; 2.1.2 The Coase Theorem; 2.1.3 The Failure of the Coase Theorem for Water Resources; 2.2 Water Allocation by Pricing Mechanisms; 2.3 Experiences with Water Markets; 2.3.1 Chile; 2.3.2 The U.S.; 2.3.3 Australia; References; Chapter 3: How Water Flows, How It Is Modeled, and How We Can Optimize It; Aside: Groundwater Terminology; 3.1 Groundwater Flow; 3.2 Hydrological Modeling; 3.3 Optimization with Linear Programming
Aside: A Two-User Optimization of Water Use with Linear Programming3.4 Hydrological Optimization; 3.4.1 Previous Applications; 3.4.2 Cost-Benefit Analysis; 3.4.3 Catchment Management Models; Aside: The WRAM Program; Aside: The CALVIN Program; 3.4.4 Key Ideas from Past Work on Hydrological Optimization; References; Chapter 4: Introduction to Smart Markets; 4.1 Analogies of Water Markets to Markets for Other Complex Commodities; 4.2 Electricity Smart Markets; 4.3 Natural Gas Smart Markets; 4.4 Precedents for Smart Markets for Water; 4.5 What Kind of Market Is a Smart Market for Water?
5.6 The Regulator Must Record and Manage Water Rights and Use5.6.1 The Regulator Must Maintain a Modern Water Rights Database; 5.6.2 The Regulator Should Redefine Initial Rights; 5.6.3 The Regulator Must Have Authority to Adjust Users ĚAllocations; 5.6.4 The Regulator Must Enforce Users ĚAllocation Limits; 5.7 The Regulator Must Grant Relevant Parties Full Legal Ability to Trade, with as Few Impediments as Reasonably Possible; References; Chapter 6: Participants in and Components of the Smart Market Institution; 6.1 The Water Regulator; 6.2 The Market Manager