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Acknowledgements; Contents; About the Authors; 1 Introduction; Abstract; 1.1 Credit Crunch and Loan Evergreening in Japan in the 1990s; 1.2 Related Literature; 1.3 Fundamental Structure of the Theoretical Model; 1.4 Existing Alternative Explanations for the Japanese Banking Behavior; 1.5 Outlook of the Book; References; 2 Examples of APR Violation in Japan in the 1990s; Abstract; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Short-Term Tenancy Protection (Tanki Chinshaku Ken in Japanese); 2.3 Mortgages with no Residual Distribution; 2.4 The Misuse of the Going-Concern Value by Bankruptcy Courts
2.5 The Jusen Housing Loan Companies Problem2.6 Conclusions; References; 3 Fundamental Structure of Our Model and the Result in the Case with no APR Violations; Abstract; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Basic Model; 3.2.1 Fundamental Structure of the Model; 3.2.2 Debt Contract; 3.2.3 Procedure in the Model; 3.2.4 The Debtor's Behavior; 3.3 The Case of no APR Violation; 3.4 Conclusions; Appendix 3.1: Proof of Lemma 3.0; Appendix 3.2: Proof of Proposition 3.1; Appendix 3.3: Proof of Proposition 3.2; Appendix 3.4: Proof of Proposition 3.3; References
4 Economic Analysis of Excess Additional Credit (Loan Evergreening)Abstract; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Structure of Postponing the Bad Loan Problem; 4.3 Excess Additional Credits and the Decision to Liquidate; 4.4 Comparative Statistics of the Magnitude of APR Violation for Inefficient Additional Lending; 4.5 Credit Crunch Caused by the Inefficient Additional Lending Problem; 4.6 Conclusions; Appendix 4.1: Proof of Lemma 4.1; Appendix 4.2: Proof of Lemma 4.2; Appendix 4.3: Proof of Lemma 4.3; Appendix 4.4: Proof of Proposition 4.4; References; 5 Empirical Evidence; Abstract; 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Empirical Implications5.3 Alternative Empirical Hypothesis; 5.4 The Strategy and Procedures of the Empirical Analysis; 5.5 Sample Division by Periods; 5.6 Regression Equation; 5.7 Data Arrangements; 5.8 Estimation Method; 5.9 Results; 5.10 Conclusions; Acknowledgements; References; 6 DIP Finance, Optimal Priority Rule, and Implications for Japanese Legal Reforms; Abstract; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Legal Priority Violation Versus Voluntary Debt Forgiveness; 6.3 DIP Finance and Accurate Adequate Protection; 6.4 Japanese Legal Reforms Related to Fundraising in the 2000s
6.4.1 The Revision of the Supreme Court Judgment6.4.2 Bankruptcy Law Reform; 6.4.3 Collateral Law and the Enforcement Procedures; 6.5 Conclusions; Appendix 6.1: Proof of Proposition 6.2; References; 7 Concluding Remarks; Abstract; Reference
2.5 The Jusen Housing Loan Companies Problem2.6 Conclusions; References; 3 Fundamental Structure of Our Model and the Result in the Case with no APR Violations; Abstract; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Basic Model; 3.2.1 Fundamental Structure of the Model; 3.2.2 Debt Contract; 3.2.3 Procedure in the Model; 3.2.4 The Debtor's Behavior; 3.3 The Case of no APR Violation; 3.4 Conclusions; Appendix 3.1: Proof of Lemma 3.0; Appendix 3.2: Proof of Proposition 3.1; Appendix 3.3: Proof of Proposition 3.2; Appendix 3.4: Proof of Proposition 3.3; References
4 Economic Analysis of Excess Additional Credit (Loan Evergreening)Abstract; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Structure of Postponing the Bad Loan Problem; 4.3 Excess Additional Credits and the Decision to Liquidate; 4.4 Comparative Statistics of the Magnitude of APR Violation for Inefficient Additional Lending; 4.5 Credit Crunch Caused by the Inefficient Additional Lending Problem; 4.6 Conclusions; Appendix 4.1: Proof of Lemma 4.1; Appendix 4.2: Proof of Lemma 4.2; Appendix 4.3: Proof of Lemma 4.3; Appendix 4.4: Proof of Proposition 4.4; References; 5 Empirical Evidence; Abstract; 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Empirical Implications5.3 Alternative Empirical Hypothesis; 5.4 The Strategy and Procedures of the Empirical Analysis; 5.5 Sample Division by Periods; 5.6 Regression Equation; 5.7 Data Arrangements; 5.8 Estimation Method; 5.9 Results; 5.10 Conclusions; Acknowledgements; References; 6 DIP Finance, Optimal Priority Rule, and Implications for Japanese Legal Reforms; Abstract; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Legal Priority Violation Versus Voluntary Debt Forgiveness; 6.3 DIP Finance and Accurate Adequate Protection; 6.4 Japanese Legal Reforms Related to Fundraising in the 2000s
6.4.1 The Revision of the Supreme Court Judgment6.4.2 Bankruptcy Law Reform; 6.4.3 Collateral Law and the Enforcement Procedures; 6.5 Conclusions; Appendix 6.1: Proof of Proposition 6.2; References; 7 Concluding Remarks; Abstract; Reference