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000801340 019__ $$a1006878667
000801340 020__ $$a9783319620367$$q(electronic book)
000801340 020__ $$a3319620363$$q(electronic book)
000801340 020__ $$z9783319620350
000801340 020__ $$z3319620355
000801340 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7$$2doi
000801340 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)on1007303751
000801340 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1007303751$$z(OCoLC)1006878667
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000801340 049__ $$aISEA
000801340 050_4 $$aHG3761
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000801340 08204 $$a332.7/5$$223
000801340 1001_ $$aMatri, Daniela.
000801340 24510 $$aCovenants and third-party creditors :$$bempirical and law & economics insights into a common pool problem /$$cDaniela Matri.
000801340 260__ $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer,$$c[2017]
000801340 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000801340 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000801340 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000801340 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000801340 347__ $$atext file$$bPDF$$2rda
000801340 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000801340 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000801340 650_0 $$aBankruptcy.
000801340 650_0 $$aDebtor and creditor.
000801340 650_0 $$aCovenants not to compete.
000801340 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z9783319620350$$z3319620355$$w(OCoLC)994638940
000801340 852__ $$bebk
000801340 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-62036-7$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
000801340 8800_ $$6505-00$$aPart I ─ Theoretical Framework and Development of Research Question: 1  Introduction ─ Covenants and Third-party Creditors -- 2 Self-help Devices of Creditor Protection -- 3 Covenants and Bilateral Creditor Protection -- Part II ─ The Systematisation of Third-party Creditor Effects of Covenants: Preliminary Framework: 4 Academic Discussion and the Relevance of Third-party Creditor Protection -- 5 Potential Externalities of the Bilateral Governance System -- 6 The Self-interested Behaviour of Banks and Its Legal Limits -- Part III ─ Empirical Research: Results and Re-evaluation of Preliminary Theory: 7 Design and Methodology -- 8 Results ─ Covenants as a Reciprocal Private Governance Creditor Protection System -- 9 Re-evaluation − Collectivisation of Creditor Protection Through Private Governance -- 10 Consequences for Legal Discussion -- Part IV ─ Summary and Outlook: 11 Summary -- 12 Outlook.
000801340 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:801340$$pGLOBAL_SET
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000801340 980__ $$aBIB
000801340 982__ $$aEbook
000801340 983__ $$aOnline
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