@article{806867,
      recid = {806867},
      author = {Azzouni, Jody,},
      title = {The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for  Metaphysics /},
      pages = {1 online resource.},
      abstract = {This monograph presents Azzouni's new approach to the  rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an  isolated individual's capacity to follow rules, and it  simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for  meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that  talk. Kripke's influential version of Wittgenstein's  rule-following paradox--and Wittgenstein's views more  generally--on the contrary, make rule-following practices  and assertions about those practices subject to community  norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni  summarizes and develops Kripke's original version of  Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox to make salient the  linchpin assumptions of the paradox. By doing so, Azzouni  reveals how compelling Kripke's earlier work on the paradox  was. Objections raised over the years by Fodor, Forbes  Ginsborg, Goldfarb, Tait, Wright, and many others, are all  shown to fail. No straight solution (a solution that denies  an assumption of the paradox) can be made to work. Azzouni  illustrates this in detail by showing that a popular family  of straight solutions due to Lewis and refined by Williams,  "reference magnetism," fail as well. And yet an overlooked  sceptical solution is still available in logical space.  Azzouni describes a series of "disposition-meaning" private  languages that he shows can be successfully used by a  population of speakers to communicate with one another  despite their ideolectical character. The same sorts of  languages enable solitary "Robinson Crusoes" to survive and  flourish in their island habitats. These  languages--sufficiently refined--have the same properties  normal human languages have; and this is the key to solving  the rule-following paradox without sacrificing the  individual's authority over her self-imposed rules or her  ability to follow those rules. Azzouni concludes this  unusual monograph by uncovering a striking resemblance  between the rule-following paradox and Hume's problem of  induction: he shows the rule-following paradox to be a  corollary of Hume's problem that arises when the problem of  induction is applied to an individual's own abilities to  follow rules. Depressingly well-argued.},
      url = {http://library.usi.edu/record/806867},
}