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Preface; Contents; About the Authors; Introduction; Part I Probability and Chance-Credence Norms; 1 A Principled Analysis of Consistency of an Abstract Principal Principle; 1.1 The Claims; 1.2 The Abstract Principal Principle Informally; 1.3 Weak Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle; 1.4 Strong Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle; 1.5 Strengthening the Abstract Principal Principle: The Stable Abstract Principal Principle; 1.6 Is the Stable Abstract Principal Principle Strongly Consistent?; 1.7 Can Bayesian Agents Always Be Rational?; 1.8 Relation to Other Works
1.8.1 David Lewis' Principal Principle and Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle1.8.2 Undermining and Consistency of Debugged Principal Principles; 1.8.3 Gaifman's Theory of Higher Order Probabilities and Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle; 1.9 The General Principal Principle; Appendix; Proof of Strong Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 4.4); Proof of Weak Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 6.2)
Example Showing That the General Method That Proves the Strong Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle Does Not Prove the Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal PrincipleProof of Strong Consistency of the General Principal Principle (Proof of Theorem 9.2); References; 2 Is it the Principal Principle that Implies the Principle of Indifference?; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 2'; Remarks on Conditions 1 and 2 and a Counterexample; References; 3 Models of Objective Chance: An Analysis through Examples; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Agent and His Model; 3.3 Examples
3.3.1 The Basics3.3.1.1 A Set of Possible Worlds; 3.3.1.2 The Event Algebra of Chancy Outcomes and Objective Chance; 3.3.1.3 The Event Algebra of the Probabilistic Setup and Historic Evidence; 3.3.1.4 Extending the Chancy Algebra; 3.3.1.5 Observations on the Structure; 3.3.2 What Is Time?; 3.3.2.1 After the First Step; 3.3.2.2 At Some Stopping Time; 3.3.2.3 Observations on the Structure; 3.3.3 Is It Always the Past?; 3.3.4 Impossible Events Have Zero Chance; 3.3.5 Frequentist's Objective Chance; 3.4 The Subjectivist Agent's Model of Objective Chance; References
4 Four Approaches to the Reference Class Problem4.1 Introduction; 4.2 An Objective Bayesian Approach; 4.3 Pollock's Approach; 4.4 The Similarity Approach; 4.5 Generic-Probability vs Single-Case-Probability Approaches; 4.6 A Mechanism-Based Approach; 4.6.1 Evidence of Mechanisms and Causal Structure; 4.6.2 Evidence of Mechanisms and Extrapolation; 4.7 Conclusions; References; Part II Structures for Quantum Experiments; 5 Separate Common Causes and EPR Correlations: An ``Almost No-Go'' Result; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Background: From Bell's Local Causality to Separate Systems of Screeners
1.8.1 David Lewis' Principal Principle and Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle1.8.2 Undermining and Consistency of Debugged Principal Principles; 1.8.3 Gaifman's Theory of Higher Order Probabilities and Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle; 1.9 The General Principal Principle; Appendix; Proof of Strong Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 4.4); Proof of Weak Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal Principle (Proposition 6.2)
Example Showing That the General Method That Proves the Strong Consistency of the Abstract Principal Principle Does Not Prove the Strong Consistency of the Stable Abstract Principal PrincipleProof of Strong Consistency of the General Principal Principle (Proof of Theorem 9.2); References; 2 Is it the Principal Principle that Implies the Principle of Indifference?; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 2'; Remarks on Conditions 1 and 2 and a Counterexample; References; 3 Models of Objective Chance: An Analysis through Examples; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Agent and His Model; 3.3 Examples
3.3.1 The Basics3.3.1.1 A Set of Possible Worlds; 3.3.1.2 The Event Algebra of Chancy Outcomes and Objective Chance; 3.3.1.3 The Event Algebra of the Probabilistic Setup and Historic Evidence; 3.3.1.4 Extending the Chancy Algebra; 3.3.1.5 Observations on the Structure; 3.3.2 What Is Time?; 3.3.2.1 After the First Step; 3.3.2.2 At Some Stopping Time; 3.3.2.3 Observations on the Structure; 3.3.3 Is It Always the Past?; 3.3.4 Impossible Events Have Zero Chance; 3.3.5 Frequentist's Objective Chance; 3.4 The Subjectivist Agent's Model of Objective Chance; References
4 Four Approaches to the Reference Class Problem4.1 Introduction; 4.2 An Objective Bayesian Approach; 4.3 Pollock's Approach; 4.4 The Similarity Approach; 4.5 Generic-Probability vs Single-Case-Probability Approaches; 4.6 A Mechanism-Based Approach; 4.6.1 Evidence of Mechanisms and Causal Structure; 4.6.2 Evidence of Mechanisms and Extrapolation; 4.7 Conclusions; References; Part II Structures for Quantum Experiments; 5 Separate Common Causes and EPR Correlations: An ``Almost No-Go'' Result; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Background: From Bell's Local Causality to Separate Systems of Screeners