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000811140 1001_ $$aAndrews, Kristin,$$d1971-
000811140 24510 $$aDo apes read minds? :$$btoward a new folk psychology /$$cKristin Andrews.
000811140 260__ $$aCambridge, Mass. :$$bMIT Press,$$c2012.
000811140 264_4 $$c2012
000811140 300__ $$a1 online resource (xi, 294 pages)
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000811140 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000811140 520__ $$aAn argument that as folk psychologists humans (and perhaps other animals) don't so much read minds as see one another as persons with traits, emotions, and social relations. By adulthood, most of us have become experts in human behavior, able to make sense of the myriad behaviors we find in environments ranging from the family home to the local mall and beyond. In philosophy of mind, our understanding of others has been largely explained in terms of knowing others' beliefs and desires; describing others' behavior in these terms is the core of what is known as folk psychology. In Do Apes Read Minds? Kristin Andrews challenges this view of folk psychology, arguing that we don't consider others' beliefs and desires when predicting most quotidian behavior, and that our explanations in these terms are often inaccurate or unhelpful. Rather than mindreading, or understanding others as receptacles for propositional attitudes, Andrews claims that folk psychologists see others first as whole persons with traits, emotions, and social relations. Drawing on research in developmental psychology, social psychology, and animal cognition, Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices (including prediction, explanation, and justification) and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and generalization from self) that are involved in our folk psychological practices. According to this understanding of folk psychology--which does not require the sophisticated cognitive machinery of second-order metacognition associated with having a theory of mind--animals (including the other great apes) may be folk psychologists, too.
000811140 588__ $$aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
000811140 650_0 $$aHuman behavior.
000811140 650_0 $$aEthnopsychology.
000811140 650_0 $$aCognitive psychology.
000811140 653__ $$aPHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General
000811140 653__ $$aCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/General
000811140 655_0 $$aElectronic books
000811140 852__ $$bebk$$hMIT Press
000811140 85640 $$3MIT Press$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9283.001.0001$$zOnline Access through The MIT Press Direct
000811140 85642 $$3OCLC metadata license agreement$$uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
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