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000812268 020__ $$a9780191861260$$q(electronic book)
000812268 035__ $$a(StDuBDS)EDZ0001844547
000812268 040__ $$aStDuBDS$$beng$$cStDuBDS$$erda$$epn
000812268 050_4 $$aBD171
000812268 08204 $$a121.63$$223
000812268 1001_ $$aMoss, Sarah,$$eauthor.
000812268 24510 $$aProbabilistic knowledge /$$cSarah Moss.
000812268 250__ $$aFirst edition.
000812268 264_1 $$aOxford :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2018.
000812268 300__ $$a1 online resource
000812268 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000812268 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000812268 338__ $$aonline resource$$2rdacarrier
000812268 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
000812268 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000812268 5208_ $$aSarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.
000812268 588__ $$aDescription based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on February 28, 2018).
000812268 650_0 $$aCertainty.
000812268 650_0 $$aProbabilities$$xPhilosophy.
000812268 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z9780198792154
000812268 85280 $$bebk$$hOxford Scholarship Online
000812268 85640 $$3Oxford scholarship online$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001$$zOnline Access
000812268 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:812268$$pGLOBAL_SET
000812268 980__ $$aEBOOK
000812268 980__ $$aBIB
000812268 982__ $$aEbook
000812268 983__ $$aOnline