Economic Analysis of Contract Law : Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information / Sugata Bag.

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Economic Analysis of Contract Law : Incomplete Contracts and Asymmetric Information / Sugata Bag.

9783319652689 (electronic book)
3319652680 (electronic book)
9783319652672
3319652672

Cham, Switzerland : Springer Science and Business Media : Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

English

1 online resource.

10.1007/978-3-319-65268-9 doi

HB73

330

This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim?s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.

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Online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed February 7, 2018).

Print version: 9783319652672

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